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I INTRODUCTION 
"Sexual harassment in the workplace is not a new 
phenomenon: legal recourse for its victims is new".l 
This paper endeavours to canvass some of the legal 
problems raised by sexual harassment, particularly as the 
subject relates to the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 in 
the civil sphere, and the criminal law generally. The 
main focus is on sexual harassment in employment, because 
this is the area which has commanded the attention of the 
judiciary, however recognition must be given to the fact 
that it infiltrates other areas of society as well. The 
paper attempts to provide some insight in to the solutions 
provided by the legal system to the sexual harassment 
problem, and raise some of the possibilities for law 
reform. 
Sadly, as prevention is always better than cure, the 
law often steps in only when the problem has arisen, and 
the damage has been done. The inevitable legal remedies 
of damages, injunctive relief or criminal sanction can 
only go part of the way to treating the deepest effects. 
Whilst the law can, and should, play a role in educating 
and raising people's awareness, the emphasis of the paper 
is on dealing with the problem once it has occurred. 
Hopefully, raising the issue by writing on it has, in 
itself, some beneficial effect. 
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II THE PROBLEM 
One commentator has described sexual harassment as 
"the most intimate manifestation of employment 
discrimination faced by women".2 Men may be harassed by 
women, however, "the historically inferior position of 
women in a male dominated workforce has resulted in the 
disproportionate exposure of women to heterosexual 
harassment".3 The reality is that invariably sexual 
harassment is going to involve a male as the perpetrator 
and a female as the victim. 
Inherently it is a topic which carries with it a 
great amount of emotion; the very intimacy of the 
behaviour can and does carry with it some deep and 
damaging effects both to the victim, and to the 
perpetrator. Harassment in a general sense involves 
repeatedly angering or irritating by annoying a person, in 
either a minor or petty, or perhaps more substantial way. 
By adding to it a sexual element, a harasser can strike at ' 
the very heart of someones personal being. Most women 
wish, as most men would, to choose whether, when, where 
and with whom to have sexual relations. Sexual harassment 
can deny this choice, at the same time as denying the 
right to work or study, or carry out one's daily life 
without being subjected to sexual demands. 
3. 
Objection to sexual harassment at work is not a 
neopuritan moral protest against signs of attraction, 
displays of affection, compliments, flirtation, or 
touching on the job. Instead, women are rattled and 
often angry about sex that is one-sided, unwelcome or 
comes with strings attached. When its something a 
women wants to turn off but can not. . or when 
it's corning from someone with economic power to hire 
or fire, help or hinder, reward or punish. . thats 
when women say its a problern.4 
The sexual because of its intimacy, is by definition 
sensitive and private. Sexual harassment thus results in 
embarassrnent, intimidation, and an absolute feeling of 
being demeaned. Its victims are afraid, despairing, alone 
and complicit. Even saying that women are oversensitive 
cannot overwhelm, and would be irrelevant to the fact that 
sexual harassment can make women feel violated for good 
reason. "Like women who are raped, sexually harassed 
women feel humiliated, degraded, ashamed, ernbarassed and 
cheap as well as angry".5 One survey resulted in the 
following comments from women who had been sexually 
harassed: 
As I remember all the sexual abuse and negative work 
experiences I am left feeling sick and helpless and 
upset instead of angry. Reinforced feelings of 
no control - sense of doom. . I have difficulty 
dropping the emotion barrier I work behind when I 
come home from work. My husband turns into just 
another man . . kept me in a constant state of 
emotional agitation and frustration; I drank a lot 
. soured the essential delight in the work .. 
stomach migraines, cried every night, no appetite.6 
Someone, perhaps especially a male, who is not a victim 
can only have a limited appreciation of the painful 
4. 
effects of the power game of sexual harassment, which 
results in sexual traps. I can do no more than avert to 
some of the sad emotions it raises, quite apart from any 
economic effects. Whilst it may not evaporate the 
effects, a legalistic response is imperative. The fact is 
that being at the mercy of male supervisors adds direct 
economic clout to male sexual demands. It can in effect 
amount to forced prostitution or selling of oneself in 
return for economic survival. 
The extent of sexual harassment is not an issue with 
which I propose to deal. However American surveys have 
resulted in the conclusion that it is both endemic 7 and 
pandemic.8 It would be naive to think there is not some 
problem here.9 The fact that the first case did not reach 
the courts until 1985,10 based on legislation passed in 
1977,ll is no more than a reflection of a lack of 
awareness. 
It is not necessary to show sexual harassment is 
commonplace to argue that is severe for the victim or that 
it is sex discrimination. Analysed as a problem that 
almost invariably effects only women, suggests sexual 
harassment to be structural, and for that reason capable 
of being regarded as discrimination, which should be 
• • 
5. 
illegal per se, without regard to damage caused to the 
victim. Of course, remedies for the victim should be 
available where appropriate. This underlying 
discrimination theme is reflected in the judicial approach 
to the subject. 
III THE CHARACTERISTICS 
There are three essential points to be considered 
when looking at a potential case of sexual harassment in 
employment. The advance by the employer, or person in the 
position of power; the response by the employee and the 
employment consequence. Thus a line must be drawn between 
friendly gestures and illegal sexual advances. Some cases 
will be clear, however there will always be the grey 
area. There is the question of to what extent the issue 
must be forced, and if a victim complies should the legal 
consequences be different than if the victim refuses? 
Given the risks, how explicitly must a victim reject; and 
might quitting a job be treated as firing under certain 
circumstances? 
Sexual harassment in employment essentially takes two 
forms. First there is "Quid pro quo harassment" 12 which 
describes an incident in which compliance with a sexual 
request is or is expected to be exchanged for an 
employment opportunity, or for the retention of an 
6. 
employment opportunity. The second is the 'hostile 
environment•l3 type of sexual harassment, when it is a 
persistent condition of work life. In this latter type 
there may be no loss, or threat of loss of a tangible work 
benefit. Thus is the situation on injury in itself? In 
the quid pro quo situation the coercion behind the 
employer's sexual advances is clarified by the reprisals 
that follow a refusal to comply. However, where the 
employer has just created a hostile work environment the 
problem is less clear in materialistic terms, though 
undoubtedly more pervasive. Short of self-defence by 
physical assault on the part of the victim, there is often 
very little the person can do to stop their employer who 
engages in visual and verbal molestation, because of the 
fact that the power lies with the employer. As MacKinnon 
says,14 it is hardly an "arms-length" transaction. 
Readers with a legal mind will be asking for sexual 
harassment to be defined. As already averted to sexual 
harassment is largely a discrimination issue, because it 
occurs by reason of the sex of the victim. As will become 
apparent, the linking of sexual harassment by legislation 
and judicial interpretation to discrimination does not 
require a legal definition to be made. Sexual harassment 
is a label, which has been given to a type of 
7. 
discriminatory behaviour. However, it is only when 
legislation specifically deals with sexual harassment 
rather than discrimination in general that it need be 
defined. Generally, it will be easily identified as 
harassment, which is carried out by using sex as a tool. 
The analysis of the case law which follows will put the 
uninitiated in touch with the scenario of sexual 
harassment; for others it will be all too familiar. 
Until recently it was not certain whether sexual 
harassment was actionable as discrimination under New 
Zealand law, and as averted to there is no statutory 
definition of sexual harassment. However, by way of 
introduction it should be noted that in June 1985 the 
Human Rights Commission issued a policy statement which 
defined sexual harassment in employment as:-
Verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature by one 
person toward another and: 
(i) the conduct is unwelcome and offensive, and 
might reasonably be perceived as unwelcome and 
offensive; and 
(ii) the conduct is of a serious nature, or is 
persistent to the extent that it has a detrimental 
effect on the conditions of an individual's 
employment, job performance or opportunities. 
Although this statement is in no way binding, it is 
illustrative of the behaviour and at least to some extent 
8. 
a reflection of the law. The statement is issued for 
informative and administrative purposes, so the commission 
can properly carry out its functions.15 
It should be noted that the conduct can be both 
verbal and physical. It can be distinguished from 
desirable romantic approaches from one to another by the 
fact that it is unwelcome and offensive. The statement 
envisages that it is not enough that an offender says in 
their defence that they did not think their behaviour was 
not welcomed; an objective standard is imported by saying 
that if the reasonable person would have perceived it as 
unwelcome and offensive then it is sexual harassment. 
This I submit is the proper approach, people must be 
deterred from, when in a position of power, engaging in 
conduct which is unwelcome and offensive to the reasonable 
person. if in the particular case the conduct was not 
unwelcome to the person receiving it, it will not come 
within the statement by virtue of the first limb of (i). 
If the conduct does fall within this first limb of (i) but 
only because of the over sensitivity of the recipient it 
will be excluded by the reasonableness standard in the 
second limb. 
9 • 
Secondly, the statement requires that the conduct is 
of a serious nature. It will be seen that this is 
reflected in the cases, and suffices by itself without 
need for further reference to any effects to the victim. 
The statement goes on to say that otherwise it suffices 
that it is persistent to the extent that it has a 
detrimental effect on the conditions of an individual's 
employment, job performance or opportunities. Invariably 
it would be serious also. This would however prevent a 
perpetrator from saying no individual act was serious, 
therefore it is not sexual harassment, where it is so 
insidious and persistent as to be detrimental to a 
person's employment. 
With this background in mind, I now go on to look at 
sexual harassment as a concept developed by the courts 
based on anti-discrimination legislation. Before doing so 
it is necessary to point out that some jurisdications16 
have enacted legislation specifically identifying sexual 
harassment and dealing with it as such. The following 
discussion is not concerned with such legislation. 
IV SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS DISCRIMINATION 
For many years sexual harassment victims were unable 
to specify what was happening to themselves; it was an 
experience without a name. Likewise as a term of art it 
has only fairly recently been identified, and been 
developed as a concept in common law legal systems. 
10. 
Sexual harassment is now readily equated with sex 
discrimination overseas, and to some extent in New 
Zealand. The first indications that sexual harassment 
might be treated as discrimination on the grounds of sex 
contrary to human rights legislation came from North 
American cases. In the United States, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act 1964 provides:-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to. . discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individuals sex. 
There is no specific reference to sexual harassment 
and at first United States court's ruled that sexual 
harassment was not discrimination under Title VII. They 
were unwilling to define sexual harassment as unlawful sex 
discrimination even in quid pro quo cases, where tangible 
employment retaliation followed the victim's rejection of 
the employer's advances In Corne v Bausch and Lomb Inc,17 
where the male supervisor persistently took unsolicited 
and unwelcome sexual liberties with the female plaintiffs, 
the District Court of Arizona held the supervisor's 
conduct to be "nothing more than a personal proclivity, 
peculiarity or mannerism", and that by his alleged sexual 
11. 
advances "was satisfying a personal urge 11 .l8 The action 
was brought against the complainant's employers. Whilst 
recognising the aim of the legislation was to provide 
equal access to the job market for both men and women, 
something that sexual harassment must restrict, the court 
distinguished the case from other unlawful employment 
practices by employers cases. They said in all other 
cases the discriminatory conduct arose out of company 
policies in which there was some apparent advantage to the 
employer and they were employer designed and oriented. 
The court said that rather than the company being 
benefitted in any way by the supervisor's conduct it can 
only be damaged by the very nature of the acts complained 
of, and that there is nothing in the act which could 
reasonably be construed to have it apply to "verbal and 
physical sexual advances".19 In reaching this decision 
the court failed to take account of the employment context 
within which the advances took place. 
The court went on to say that it would be ludicrous 
to hold that sexual harassment was contemplated by the Act 
because to do so would mean that if the conduct was 
directed at both male and female employees equally, no 
breach would have occurred. Whilst it is undoubtedly the 
case that whilst sexual harassment is viewed solely as a 
12. 
discrimination problem by the law, the extremely unlikely 
case of the sexually harassing bi-sexual employer, who 
treated her or his employees "equally" escapes the 
section. The answer is not to say therefore that no 
sexual harassment case is covered, but to reform the law. 
The court was concerned that to hold other than they 
did would mean "a potential federal lawsuit every time any 
employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward 
another", and that "the only sure way an employer could 
avoid such charges would be to have employees who were 
asexual 11 • 2 0 What the court failed to recognise was that 
counsel for the plaintiffs were not disputing the maxim, 
"there is no harm in asking". The conduct went far beyond 
acceptable romantic or even sexual overtures, and failed 
to recongise that "no" means no. "Clearly underlying 
these early decisions was the fear that sexual harassment 
was a Pandora's box to be opened by the judiciary at its 
peril 11 • 21 In a similar vein in Tomkins v Public Servic~ 
Electric & Gas Co,22 Stern D.J., held because the intent 
of Title VII, 
is to make careers open to talents irrespective of 
sex or race, [and not] to provide a federal tort 
remedy for what amounts to a physical attack 
motivated by sexual desire on the part of a 
supervisor, and which happened to occur in a 
corporate corridor rather than a back alley, 
13. 
the complainant's allegation against her employer and 
supervisor based on such an attack is outside the scope of 
Title VII. 
In Barnes v Train 2 3 the court refused Barnes relief, 
after losing her job following a refusal to have a sexual 
relationship with her supervisor. The court reached the 
conclusion that, "this is a controversy underpinned by the 
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship".24 
It was on appeal from this case that the United States 
Court of Appeals 25 first accepted that sexual harassment 
was illegal under Title VII. Prior to this though the 
District Court in Williams v Saxbe 26 had held where a male 
supervisor had taken retaliatory action against a female 
employee who refused his sexual advances a claim of sex 
discrimination could be stated. 
A. Barnes v Castle - The Gender-Plus Concept 
In Barnes v Castle, Spottswood J. held that under 
Title VII discrimination is sex discrimination .whenever 
sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in 
the discrimination.27 The argument that a woman who is 
sexually harassed has not suffered sex discrimination 
because her job was terminated not because she was a 
woman, but because she refused sexual advances was soundly 
rejected. But for her womanhood the woman's participation 
in sexual activity would not be solicited. 
-14. 
To say, then, that she was victimised in her employment simply because she declined the invitation is to ignore the asserted fact that she was invited only because she was a woman subordnate to the inviter in the hierachy of agency personnel. Put another way, she became the target of her superior's sexual desires because she was a woman and was asked to bow to his demands as the price for holding her job. The circumstances imparting high visibility to the role of gender in the affair is that no male employer was susceptible to such an approach by the appellant's supervisor.28 
Thus the "gender-plus" approach to sexual harassment 
was born; that is to say that the detriment to, or the 
dismissal of the victim, need only be substantially 
because of the person's sex, not solely. 
The court rejected the argument that sexual 
harassment could not be gender discrimination simply 
because a women could also harass a man, or because any 
homosexual supervisor could harass an employee of the same 
gender. They said in each instance the question is one of 
but - for causation; would the complainant have suffered 
the harassment had he or she been of a different gender? 
Only by what was described as a "reductio ad absurdum" 
could the court imagine a case of harassment that is not 
sex discrimination, where a bisexual supervisor harasses 
men and women alike.29 
The process of judicial evolution was allowed to run 
its course, and it is, as stated in Holren v Sears Roebuck 
& Co now "well settled that [sexual harassment] can amount 
15. 
to discrimination on the basis of sex under Title vrr.30 
United States decisions have acknowledged that the 
"stereotype of the sexually accommodating secretary is 
well documented in popular novels, magazines, cartoons and 
the theatre 11 ,31 and that often this stereotype is 
reflected by the harassment of woman which amounts to 
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
The leading Canadian authority on the subject is 
Zarankin v Wessex Inn. 32 In that case the complainant a 
chambermaid was subjected to touching and patting by her 
employer. The Board held she had been sexually harassed, 
then discussed the question of jurisdiction. The judgment 
noted that some jurisdictions have legislation specifying 
sexual harassment as illegal, but said it was dealing only 
with cases which prohibit discrimination "because of" or 
based on" sex.33 The board held that it is fallacious to 
think that for sexual harassment to amount to 
discrimination all employees of the same gender had to be · 
equal recipients of it. The gender-plus approach was 
applied, by holding that as long as gender provides a 
basis for differentiation it matters not that further 
differentiation on another basis is made. The board held 
that there is no requirement that there be special 
provision for sexual harassment before it can amount to 
discrimination and further said that" . numerous 
Canadian human rights tribunals have so found. No 
tribunal or court to my knowledge has found to the 
contrary 11 .34 The judgment finished by saying, 
16. 
I think a fair summary of the reasoning in the 
Canadian tribunal decisions is that sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex when it puts up an 
obstacle to achievement in a job because of gender. 
An employee should not have to bear the extra burden of gratifying or tolerating her (or his) employer's 
need for sexual titillation as a term or condition of employment. I conclude that sexual harassment is 
discrimination because of sex whenever it comes 
within the definition I have adopted and is not 
imposed upon both equally. 35 
The landmark New South Wales decision of O'Callaghan 
v Loder,36 was the first Australian case to deal directly 
with the question of sexual harassment as discrimination 
on the grounds of sex. Section 24(1) of the 
Anti-Discrimination Act (N.S.W) provides:-
A person discriminates against another person on the ground of his sex if, on the ground of 
(A) his sex; 
he treats him less favourably than in the same 
circumstances or in circumstances which are not 
materially different, he treats or would treat a 
person of the opposite sex. 
Section 25(2) further provides that it is unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground 
of his sex by dismissing him or subjecting him to any 
other detriment, or in the terms or conditions of 
employment which he affords him. O'Callaghan, the lift 
attendant, alleged she had been sexually harassed by the 
17. 
department's commissioner and it was held that this 
amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex within the 
meaning of the Act. In applying the gender-plus principle 
the court held that it is irrelevant that factors other 
than the employee's gender might have contributed to the 
employer's conduct so long as gender was a substantial 
contributing factor. It was noted that if an employee 
were to be sexually harassed by an employer of the same 
sex, then that employee would have precisely the same 
rights under the Act as the complainant did in this case. 
Similarly in Victoria, the Supreme Court in B v Equal 
Opportunity Board & Anor; ex parte Burns & Anor 3 7 held 
that sexual harassment was covered by general provisions 
prohibiting sex discrimination, and that such conduct 
would fall within the ambit of a discriminatory act by one 
person against another on the basis of that person's sex. 
V H v E - THE LANDMARK IN NEW ZEALAND 
Until recently it was not certain whether sex~al 
harassment was at all actionable as discrimination ~nder 
New Zealand law, and it remains the case that there is no 
legislation dealing specifically with sexual harassment. 
However, in 1985 the Equal Opportunities Tribunal in 
deciding the case of~ v ~,38 made it clear that in some 
cases there could be recourse against sexual harassment in 
New Zealand. The tribunal held that, 
18. 
Parliament must be presumed to have intended that the unlawful discrimination sections of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, as they relate to employment should be in conformity with New Zealand's international obligations. As we see it only if section 15 [of the Human Rights Commission Act] outlaws sexual harassment along with other discriminatory practices based on sex, will women in the workforce be afforded "just and favourable conditions of work" and otherwise be "guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men". 
Thus they concluded that sexual harassment is covered 
by section lS(l)(c) of the Human Rights Commission Act 
1977. Section lS(l)(c) provides:-
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person who is an employer, or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of any person who is an employer. (c) to dismiss any person, or subject any person to any detriment in circumstances in which other persons employed by that employer or work of that description are not or would not be dismissed or are not or would not be subjected to such detriment -
by reason of the sex. . of that person. 
The tribunal adopted the "gender-plus" approach to 
sexual harassment, and said that such dismissal or 
detriment need only be substantially because of the 
person's sex. 
It was found tht the plaintiff after being sexually 
harassed with "increasing intensity'' over a period of 
seven months, eventually resigned from her job. 
the finding that the plaintiff had been "sexually 
In making 
harassed'' the tribunal made no attempt to define sexual 
harassment. It can therefore be said that the question of 
19. 
whether a person has been sexually harassed is a question 
of fact, rather than law. Once the conduct has been found 
for a fact to have occurred, a nexus must be established 
between that conduct and the dismissal or detriment. If 
the harassment is sexual it may afford the finding that 
the dismissal or detriment was "by reason of the sex. 
of that person". Thus as long as the conduct, whatever it 
may be, results in the dismissal of, or a detriment to the 
employee, and the same conduct would not have been 
forthcoming towards a member of the opposite sex and 
resulted in a detriment to that person, or their 
dismissal, then the victim has been unlawfully 
discriminated against. For the tribunal to have attempted 
to define sexual harassment would have been unnecessary 
and dangerously limiting. Sexual harassment rather than 
being a strictly legal concept in New Zealand, can be 
viewed as a label to be attached to a particular type of 
conduct which some people, probably almost invariably 
males, indulge in and which in some circumstances is 
illegal discrimination on the grounds of sex. An 
important point arises from this, that just because it is 
sexual harassment, will not necessarily mean it is 
illegal. 
Prior to H v E other cases came before the Equal 
Opportunities Tribunal but none called for a definitive 
ruling as to the correct interpretation of Section 15. 
20. 
In Crockett v Canterbury Clerical Workers Union39 the 
plaintiff had had a sexual liason with his supervisor Mrs 
S. for about a year, when it was terminated. The 
plaintiff alleged that Mrs S. had subsequently sought 
against his will to revive it, and that when after a 
serious row in the office he proffered her an undated 
resignation signed by him and she dated and accepted ·it 
she was actuated by ill-will arising from his rejection of 
her advances and that this behaviour was covered under 
Section 15(1). The Plaintiff argued a broad view of 
Section 15(1) should be taken, referring to the North 
American decisions. While sympathetic to these arguments 
the tribunal found it unnecessary to express a considered 
opinion as to the scope of section 15(1) as it held that 
sex was not at all a factor in Mrs S. accepting the 
plaintiff's resignation. The plaintiff failed to 
establish that Mrs S's motive in accepting his resignation 
had been resentment at his alleged refusal to resume 
cohabitation, rather it was accepted because it was the 
appropriate response in order to terminate the stre~ses 
and strains on the office resulting from the plaintiff's 
behaviour. 
In S v E & Ors40 the plaintiff's claim was dismissed 
under section 55 of the Human Rights Commission Act, as 
being one of a trivial nature. The tribunal said the 
21. 
extent to which sexual harassment is covered by the Act is 
uncertain and it is for the tribunal to decide finally in 
the appropriate case whether or not sexual harassment 
comes within section 15(l)(c). 
The behavour which was held to be sexual harassment 
in H v E was varied and carried out over a lengthy 
period. The defendant propositioned the plaintiff on a 
number of occasions, and the plaintiff frequently 
complained to him, and made it clear that his attentions 
were unwelcome. There were many comments, suggestions and 
invitations of a sexual nature, accompanied by unwanted 
physical contacts, as well as what was described by the 
tribunal as the "peeping Torn" incident at the plaintiffs 
house. The defendant's behaviour culminated with an 
episode of indecent exposure, and an attempt by the 
defendant to physically force his attentions on the 
plaintiff. It was this final incident which resulted in 
the plaintiff's resignation. 
The tribunal held that for the plaintiff to succeed, 
she had to establish that the defendant was her employer; 
that she was dismissed or subjected to detriment; that the 
dismissal or detriment occurred in circumstances in which 
other persons employed by the defendant in the shop would 
not have been dismissed or subjected to such detriment; 
-22. 
and finally that the dismissal or detriment occurred by 
reasons of her sex. 
There was no difficulty with the first point as the 
defendant was clearly the plaintiff's employer. This 
requirement is just asserted by the tribunal without 
explanation. The section provides that an employer has to 
dismiss or subject to detriment "any person", and does not 
expressly say ''any employee". However by implication the 
person must be their employee. An employer can only 
dismiss their employee, and although could conceivably 
subject someone other than their employee to a detriment 
it would be most odd indeed if the first "any person'' as 
referred to in section 15(1) had to be their employee, 
while the second could be anyone. 
The plaintiff's case on the second point was 
initially based on constructive dismissal, but in the 
alternative argued on the basis that she had been 
subjected to "detriment''. The tribunal held the treatment 
she received from the defendant left her with no 
alternative but to resign, and that in the circumstances 
the plaintiff's resignation was in substance a dismissal. 
Once having reached that conclusion the tribunal did not 
consider the detriment issue. 
23. 
In The Auckland and Gisborne Amalgamated Society of 
Shop Employees and Related Trades Industrial Union of 
Workers v Woolworths (New Zealand) Limited,41 Cooke J. 
held that the concept of dismissal is certainly capable of 
including cases where a breach of duty by the employer 
leads a worker to resign. He said that just as a servant 
must be good and faithful, so must an employer be good and 
considerate, thus an employer can be guilty of misconduct 
justifying the employee in leaving at once without 
notice. However, he recognised that as the circumstances 
in which this may occur are so infinitely various, it is 
impossible to have a rule of law prescribing the 
circumstances in which an employee will be justified, and 
those in which an employee will not be. It is a question 
of fact, not law. Cooke J. said, 
It may be that in New Zealand a term recognising that 
there ought to be a relationship of confidence and 
trust is implied as a normal incident of the 
relationship of employer and employee. It would be a 
corollary of the employee's duty of fidelity 42 
And the seriousness of any breach of an employer's 
duties will often be important in deciding whether a 
resignation was in substance a dismissal. 43 
Following this lead the tribunal in~ v ~ held it to 
be an implied term of any employment contract that both 
parties, "will so conduct themselves that the necessary 
relationship of confidence and trust between them will not 
be disrupted or destroyed 11 .44 Applying this principle to 
the facts of the case they held that the defendant 
11111 
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destroyed that relationship, and that the breach of the 
agreement was so fundamental that it brought the 
relationship to an end. Further applying the Woolworths45 
case, which was concerned with the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973, to the Human Rights Commission Act, the tribunal 
held that what occurred can be correctly described as a 
constructive dismissal. 
In the context of an Act aimed at good industrial 
relations (cf. the Human Rights Commission Act aimed 
at eliminating discrimination) it is right to assume 
that Parliament would have meant 'dismissal' (cf. 
dismiss) to cover cases where in substance the 
employer had dismissed a worker although technically 
there has been a resignation. 4 6 
This assumption because of the remedial nature of the 
Human Rights Commission Act would apply a fortiori. 
The last two points that the plaintiff needed to 
establish are inextricably linked, and hence the tribunal 
dealt with them together. Counsel for the defendant 
argued, as had been argued in the United States, and 
successfully in the earlier cases, that the sexual 
harassment occurred because the plaintiff appealed 
sexually to the defendant and the fact that they were in a 
work situation is irrelevant. Therefore it was not the 
sex of the plaintiff but the fact that she appealed 
sexually to the defendant that resulted in her dismissal. 
This argument failed, because as already stated, the 
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tribunal adopted the gender-plus criteria recognised in 
the United States, Canadian and Australian jurisdictions. 
In reaching this conclusion the tribunal saw their 
task in the absence of binding authority as one of 
statutory interpretation. In noting Section S(j) of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 192447 they observed that if any 
act ever called for a liberal and enabling interpretation 
the Human Rights Commission Act must be it. Furthermore 
the Act is designed to promote human rights in New Zealand 
in general accordance with the United Nations 
International Covenants on Human Rights. 4 8 New Zealand 
has ratifed the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights", 
Article 23 of which reads: 
"l Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work 
and to protection against unemployment". 
Article 7 of the "International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights" which has also been ratified 
begins: 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work which ensure, in 
particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a 
minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of 
equal value without distinction of any kind, in 
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work 
not inferior to those enjoyed by men . " 
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The tribunal held Parliament must be presumed to have 
intended that section 15 should be in conformity with New 
Zealand's international obligations.49 Only if the 
section outlaws sexual harassment, along with other sex 
based discriminatory practices can women 1n the workforce 
be said to be afforded "just and favourable conditions of 
work" and be "guaranteed conditions of work not inferior 
to those enjoyed by men". Although men can be sexually 
harassed and discriminated against because they are males, 
the generally disadvantaged position of women in the 
workforce makes it more likely, as is the case, that they 
will be sexually harassed and discriminated against. The 
tribunal held that a purposive approach is the only 
appropriate method for statutory interpretation of 
legislation enacted to promote the advancement of human 
rights. 
Applying the "gender-plus" approach to the subj e ct, 
which is just as valid here as in the overseas 
jurisdictions, it can be said that the substantial cause 
of the plaintiff's dismissal was her sex, as but for her 
sex she would not have been subjected to the treatment she 
was, by the defendant. In reaching this conclusion the 
tribunal did not require the plaintiff to positively prove 
the defendant was heterosexual, and not bi-sexual, and 
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therefore would not have treated male employees, had he 
had any in the same manner. The tribunal did not raise 
the issue, and appears to have presumed heterosexuality. 
Support for this approach can be drawn from the Loder case 
where the Court said that it was an appropriate matter for 
the taking of judicial notice that heterosexual people 
substantially outnumber bi-sexual people in the community 
and that therefore heterosexual activities are much more 
likely to be undertaken by heterosexual persons than 
sexual harassment of both sexes by a bi-sexual person. 
Therefore assuming the factual basis of the complaint, it 
is likely to indicate heterosexual tendencies on the part 
of the defendant, unless there is evidence to the 
contrary. 
Section 15(l)(c) requires that it be shown that other 
persons employed by the defendant employer on work of that 
description are not, or would not be dismissed or 
subjected to the same detriment. To satisfy this 
requirement it is not necessary to show that there are 
other persons employed by the defendant on work of that 
description, who were not dismissed or subjected to the 
same detriment. The "are not, or would not be" as used in 
Section 15(1)(c) makes it clear that it is only necessary 
to show that had there been other employees employed by 
the defendant on work of that description that they would 
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not have been dismissed or subjected to the same 
detriment. Those ''other employees", or notional other 
employees are necessarily of the opposite sex to the 
plaintiff, in a case of sexual harassment, which is 
dealing with discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
Therefore because in H v E it can be presumed that the 
defendant was heterosexual, any males the defendant might 
have employed to do the same work as the plaintiff would 
not have been dismissed by reasons of their sex. 
A. The Remedy 
In making an award in favour of the plaintiff, the 
tribunal made a declaration pursuant to Section 38(6)(a) 
of the Human Rights Commission Act that the defendant had 
committed a breach of the Act. The plaintiff was denied 
an order pursuant to Section 38(6)(b) of the Act 
restraining the defendant from repeating the breach or 
from engaging in conduct of the same kind, or of a similar 
kind. It was though that the salutary experience of the 
ruling against the defendant was sufficient restraint. 
The plaintiff sought damages to the maximum allowable 
under the Act, namely, $2,000 for humiliation, loss of 
dignity and injury to feelings, pursuant to Section 
40(1)(c) of the Act. However, the award was for only $750 
as it was though that the maximum allowable should be kept 
for the most serious of cases. The tribunal took into 
account the fact that the plaintiff was a mature, sexually 
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experienced woman who handled much of the harassment she 
was subjected to in a level headed and even tolerant way. 
The plaintiff also recovered the monetary loss she 
suffered prior to finding alternative employment, and $500 
costs. 
VI UNITED KINGDOM 
Subsequent to H v ~' the case of Strathclyde Regional 
Council v Porcelli50 was decided on appeal in England. In 
having to decide whether sexual harassment amounted to 
discrimination in contravention of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 (U.K. ), the court suprisingly said there is no 
assistance whatever to be found in any decided case in the 
United Kingdom or elsewhere. Nevertheless the court held 
that the sexual harassment to which the plaintiff was 
subjected was less favourable treatment on the ground of 
her sex. 
The perpetrators51 of the harassment pursued a policy , 
of vindictive unpleasantness towards the plaintiff for the 
deliberate purpose of making her apply for a transfer to 
another school. It was clear that the perpetrators would 
have treated a male colleague whom they disliked as much 
as they disliked Porcelli just as unpleasantly. However, 
their behaviour included treatment which could be labelled 
as sexual harassment, though was not exclusively sexual 
harassment. 
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On the question of whether Porcelli was discriminated 
against on the grounds of sex the appellants submitted 
that as the episodes of ''sexual harassment" were merely 
part of a single campaign founded on their dislike for 
her, therefore such treatment was not to be seen as having 
been meted out to her because she was a woman but because 
she was heartily disliked as a person and a colleague. 
Therefore, it was argued, there was no discrimination on 
the grounds of sex. 
Section 1(1) of the United Kingdom Act provides that 
"A person discriminates against a woman in any 
circumstances relevant for the purposes of any 
provision of this Act if -
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less 
favourably than he treats or would treat a man 
The court held that the section is concerned with 
"treatment" and not with the motive or objective of the 
person responsible for it. 52 Although in some cases it 
will be obvious the perpetrator of the harassment has a 
sex related purpose in mind, the court said that it does 
not follow that because the campaign pursued against 
Porcelli as a whole had no sex-related motive or 
objective, treatment which was of the nature of sexual 
harassment can not be regarded as having been "on the 
ground of her sex". The sexual harassment part of the 
campaign was clearly pursued only because Porcelli was a 
II 
woman. It was a particular kind of weapon which would not 
have been used against an equally disliked man. The 
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sexual harassment was a particularly degrading and 
unacceptable form of treatment which the court said it 
must be taken to have been the intention of Parliament to 
restrain. This is so because it would not have figured in 
a campaign by the perpetrators directed against a man, 
because of that person's sex. 
I submit the same principles must apply to section 
15(1)(c) of the Human Rights Commission Act. If a male 
employer took a dislike to a female employee, and 
undertook a successful campaign designed to get that 
employee to resign, and that campaign consisted 
substantially or wholly of sexual harassment, then that 
constructive dismissal would be in circumstances in which 
male employees would not be dismissed by reason of their 
sex. The section is not concerned with the employer's 
purpose, rather the method used to obtain that purpose. 
The male employer, assuming heterosexuality, would not 
have used sexual harassment in such a campaign against a 
male employee. In most cases however, the method and the 
purpose ~ill coincide. 
VII FROM DISMISSAL TO DETRIMENT 
Should a victim of sexual harassment have to wait 
until the employer's behaviour has intensified to such an 
extent that the victim is forced into the position, like 
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Mrs Hin H VE of having to resign? Furthermore should 
not a victim have legal recourse the moment any sexual 
harassment manifests itself, thus being actionable per se 
without a requirement of further damage, because sexual 
harassment is intrinsically bad and therefore damaging. 
As I have said, section lS(l)(c) provides as an 
alternative to the requirement of dismissal, the 
subjecting of any person to any "detriment". The question 
therefore is what will amount to "detriment''? Detriment 
will clearly cover demotion, or not being promoted or 
employed, but will it also cover the general problem of 
creating a hostile or uncomfortable work environment where 
there is not a clearly quantifiable loss? There is no New 
Zealand case to date which has had to consider the meaning 
of detriment under Section lS(l}(c). However in England 
in the case of Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah53 Brandon 
L.J. said "detriment" simply means "disadvantage" when 
considering the meaning of the word for the purposes of 
section 6(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act (U.K) 1975. 
This section provides it is unlawful discrimination if an 
employer treats an employee less favourably on the ground 
of their sex by "subjecting [that employee] . to any 
other detriment". The court held that to require the male 
employees to work at times in an area of the factory which 
was extremely dirty, whilst never requiring female 
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employees to do the same, was discrimination against the 
male plaintiff as it subjected him to a detriment. 
In Porcelli54 the appellants conceded that the 
respondent was subject to a "detriment", and the court 
without considering the matter noted that they were well 
advised to make that concession, because of the Ministry 
of Defence v Jeremiah decision. The question therefore is 
can "detriment" be construed as disadvantage under section 
lS(l)(c) and if so how wide does it go? The New Zealand 
Arbitration Court have consistently construed 
"disadvantage" as only economic disadvantages,55 however 
the court in Jeremiah when equating detriment with 
disadvantage clearly did not intend it to have this 
narrower meaning, because of the conlusion they reached on 
the facts. Furthermore, the Arbitration Court were 
dealing with ''disadvantage" in a different context, namely 
the personal grievance procedures of the Industrial 
Relations Act, for which different considerations apply. 
The word used in Section lS(l)(c) is "detriment" and to 
say that it means "disadvantage" is not to limit it in any 
way, rather to point out its breadth in that it may be 
anything which is not a benefit. Arguably there is 
inherent in any sexual harassment some detriment to the 
victim in the broadest sense of the word, such as the loss 
of job satisfaction because of a less comfortable working 
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environment. To the 'weaker victim' the mental stresses 
and personal strain would cause quite severe detriment. 
Even to the 'strong victim', there would at least be the 
minimal detriment of nuisance value caused by being 
sexually discriminated against. Ideally in such a case 
the sexual harassment should still be actionable, because 
of the value of having legal recourse against sexual 
harassment per se. Whilst damages in such a case might be 
minimal, reflecting the minimal amount of detriment, the 
fact of bringing a successful action against the 
perpetrator should have the desired educational and 
punitive effects. Although in Jeremiah,56 Brightman L.J. 
(as he then was) was prepared to equate detriment or 
disadvantage with less favourable treatment, he thought it 
possible to imagine a case where there is differentiation 
between the sexes, but no detriment to one party, and said 
that to fall within the section the differentiation must 
be associated with detriment. Is sexual harassment always 
associated with detriment, or are there cases where it is , 
just differentiation and therefore not actionable? 
VIII BUNDY v JACKSON - A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 
The first case in the United States where an employer 
was held to have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act 1964 merely by subjecting an employee to sexual 
harassment, even though the employee's resistance to that 
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harassment did not cause the employer to deprive her of 
any tangible job benefits was Bundy v Jackson.57 In all 
previous cases where sexual harassment had been found to 
amount to discriminatory behaviour, adverse employment 
consequences had followed the complainant's rejections of 
the employer's advances. 
The appellant in Bundy claimed that she had been 
subjected to unwanted sexual advances from a number of her 
supervisors, and the District Court found that sexual 
intimidation was a normal condition of Sandra Bundy's 
employment, and further that it was "a standard operating 
procedure 11 58 in the department as Bundy was not the only 
woman subjected to sexual intimidation by her male 
supervisors. 
Her experiences began, when she received and rejected 
sexual propositions from Jackson, then a fellow employee 
but at the time of the action the director. Jackson was 
the named defendant in the action in his offical capacity, 
as an employer under the United States legislation is 
liable for discriminatory acts committed by supervisory 
personne1.59 
Two years later the sexual intimidation began to 
intertwine directly with her employment, when Bundy 
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received propositions from two of her supervisors. One of 
them, Burton, began sexually harassing Bundy by 
continually calling her into his office, asking her about 
her weekend activities, and questioning her about her 
sexual proclivities. He told her he had books and 
pictures at home to support his theory that Bundy's horse 
riding was to obtain sexual relief, and suggested she come 
to his apartment to see them during the workday afternoon 
instead of performing her job related activities. He 
repeated his requests by telephoning her at home on her 
unlisted telephone number. 
The other supervisor Gainey also began making sexual 
advances to Bundy, asking her to join him at a motel and 
on a trip to the Bahamas. Bundy complained to their 
supervisor Swain who just said to her that "any man in his 
right mind would want to rape you" and then requested that 
she begin a sexual relationship with him in his apartment, 
which Bundy rejected. 
The District Court when denying relief found that 
Bundy's supervisors did not take the "game" of sexually 
propositioning female employees "seriously" and that 
Bundy's rejection of their advances did not evoke in them 
any motive to take any action against her.60 However, as 
the appeal court noted, there was evidence directly 
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contrary to this as after complaints were made by Bundy 
her work suddenly began to be criticised and her 
supervisors at least created the impression that they were 
impeding her promotion and did nothing to help her pursue 
her harassment claims through established channels. 
The District Court declined Bundy relief on the 
ground that when she rejected her employer's advances she 
had not lost any tangible job benefits. It held that 
sexual harassment not leading to loss or denial of 
tangible employment benefits for the harassed employee 
.fell outside the scope of discrimination with respect to 
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" as 
referred to in Title VII. 
The Court of Appeals had to decide whether what it 
termed "sexual harassment in itself" was covered by Title 
VII. On the basis of the earlier case of Barnes61 there 
was no difficulty in inferring that Bundy suffered 
discrimination, or different treatment, on the basis of 
sex. 
The court then answered in the affirmative the 
question of whether sexual harassment of the sort suffered 
by Bundy amounted by itself to sex discrimination with 
respect to her "terms, conditions or privileges of 
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employment". The court looked at other United States 
cases finding Title VII violations where an employer 
created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work 
environment, regardless of whether the complaining 
employees lost any tangible job benefit as a result of the 
job discrimination. 
Bundy's claim was that "conditions of employment" 
include the psychological and emotional work environment, 
and that the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning 
propositions to which she was indisputably subjected and 
which caused her anxiety and debilitation illegally 
poisoned that environment. 
The Court of Appeals followed the Title VII principle 
stated by Goldberg J. in Rogers v Equal Employment 
Opportunity Cornrnission.62 The plaintiff in that case had 
not suffered any loss of tangible job benefits but had had 
to work in an environment which was discriminatory and 
offensive on the grounds of race. Goldberg J. recognised 
that the express language of Title VII did not mention the 
situation, however he went on to say:-
"Congress chose neither to enumerate specific 
discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso 
the paramaters of such nefarious activities. Rather 
it pursued the path of wisdom by being 
unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the 
order of the day and that the seemingly reasonable 
practices of the present can easily become the 
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injustices of the morrow. Time was when employment 
discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of 
isolated and distinguishable events, manifesting 
itself, for example, in an employers practices of 
hiring, firing and promoting. But today employment 
discrimination is a for more complex and pervasive 
phenomenon, as the nuances and subtleties of 
discriminatory employment practices are no long 
confined to bread and butter issues". 63 
The reality is that sexual harassment is an example 
of discrimination going further than the question of 
whether or not a person gets or keeps the job. As 
Goldberg J. said in Rogers, "one can readily envision 
working environments so heavily polluted with 
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and 
psychological stability of minority group workers 11 • 64 
This equally applies to women, the sex most likely to be 
sexually harassed because of, inter alia, institutional 
inequalities in the work force. Whilst there may be no 
question of the employee losing their "bread and butter", 
particularly if they are an employee who cannot stand up 
to the sexual advances of the employer, the discrimination 
can be extremely debilitating. 
Goldberg J. concluded that "'terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment' is an expansive concept which 
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of 
creating a work environment heavily charged with ethnic or 
racial discrimination".65 Similarly Skelly Wright J. in 
Bundy held the principle to apply to sex 
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discrimination.66 As I said earlier, the Court of Appeals 
considered itself to be deciding the question of whether 
sexual harassment in itself was illegal, however whether 
or not they affirmatively decided this question is not 
clear from the judgment. The District Court in Bundy 
appeared to find that even the plaintiff had a casual 
attitude toward the pattern of unsolicited sexual advances 
thereby implying that these advances by themselves did no 
harm to female employees. However, the appellate court 
found no basis for this finding since Bundy's testimony 
that the sexual harassment she endured did her serious 
emotional harm with essentially unrefuted. The court went 
on to say that the essential basis for the District 
Court's refusal to hold that sexual harassment was "in 
itself" a violation of Title VII was not this factual 
finding but the District Court's construction of Title 
VII.67 The implication which could follow from this is 
that the Court of Appeals was prepared to find sexual 
harassment "in itself" illegal. 
The court cites various other discriminatory 
environment cases and says their relevance to sexual 
harassment is beyond serious dispute. In Rogers68 the 
plaintiff claimed that by giving discriminatory service to 
its Hispanic clients the firm created a discriminatory and 
offensive work environment for its Hispanic employees. 
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Racial or ethnic discrimination against the clients 
reflects no intent to discriminate directly against the 
company's minority employees, but in poisoning the 
atmosphere of employment it violates Title VII. One court 
went even further in Waters v Heublien Inc.,69 and held 
that a white plaintiff had standing to sue her employer 
who discriminated against blacks, since she has a 
statutory right to work in an environment free of racial 
prejudice. Against this background Skelly Wright C.J. 
said: 70 
Sexual sterotyping through discriminatory dress 
requirements may be benign in intent, and may offend 
women only in a general, atmospheric manner, yet it 
violates Title VII.71 Racial slurs, though 
intentional and directed at individuals, may still be 
just verbal insults, yet they too may create Title 
VII liability. How then can sexual harassment, which 
injects the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into 
the general work environment and which always 
represents an intentional assault on an individual's 
innermost privacy, not be illegal? 
This statement can be interpreted as saying that sexual 
harassment is in itself illegal under Title VII without 
having to prove any additional harm. However as Sandra 
Bundy did suffer additional harm, in the form of 
psychological and emotional upset, such a conclusion can 
only be obiter, and is perhaps why this was not spelt out 
in more explicit terms. 
A. Supreme Court Approval 
Subsequent to the decision in Bundy v Jackson the 
United States Supreme Court handed down the decision of 
Meritor Savings Banks, FSB v Vinson72 which at least to a 
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certain extent supports the Bundy approach. 
did not go the Supreme Court. 
Bundy itself 
In Vinson the respondent alleged that during her four 
years at the bank she had "constantly been subjected to 
sexual harassment" by Taylor her supervisor, in violation 
of Title VII.73 The allegations of sexual harassment 
included Taylor suggesting the two of them go to a motel 
to have sexual relations, which although at first refused 
was agreed to by the respondent, out of fear of losing her 
job. Thereafter Taylor was alleged to have repeatedly 
made demands upon her for sexual favours, usually at the 
bank, both during and after business hours. Taylor was 
also alleged to have fondled the respondent in front of 
other employees, followed her into the women's restroom, 
exposed himself, and forcibly raped her on several 
occasions. Taylor denied all these allegations, and the 
respondent was at first instance denied relief, without 
the court resolving the conflicting testimony about the 
existence of a sexual relationship. The District Court 
held: 
If Respondent and Taylor did engage in an intimate or 
sexual relationship during the time of respondents 
employment with [the bank], that relationship was a 
voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued 
employment at [the bank] or her advancement or 
promotion at that institution.74 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court 
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decision, and then the bank appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Vinson had not suffered any tangible or economic 
loss, and the appellants agreed that without question when 
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of 
the subordinates sex that supervisor "discriminate(s)" on 
the basis of sex. However, they argued that 
"compensation, terms, conditions or privileges" of 
employment are concerned with tangible loss of an economic 
character not purely psychological aspects of the 
workplace environment. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument as the 
phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment' 
evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment between men and women in 
employment"75 Rehnquist J. (as he then was) referred to 
the Roger's line of cases and said nothing in Title VII 
suggests that a hostile environment based on 
discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise 
prohibited.76 Rehnquist J. cited Henson v Dundee where it 
was held: 
Sexual harassment creates a hostile or offensive 
environment for members of one sex is every bit the 
arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the work 
piace that racial harassment is to racial equality. 
Surely, a requirement that a man or women run a 
guantlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege 
of being allowed to work and make a living can be as 
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial 
epithets. 77 
Thus Bundy v Jackson was supported at least to the extent 
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of saying that not just sexual harassment which causes 
tangible or economic loss will violate Title VII. However 
was the Supreme Court prepared to hold that sexual 
harassment was in itself illegal? 
Rehnquist J. held that not all work place conduct 
that may be described as "harassment" ·affects a "term, 
condition or privilege of employment" within the meaning 
of Title VII. For sexual harassment to be actionable it 
must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an 
abusive working environment".78 In support he cited 
Rogers v Equal Opportunity Commission where it was held 
that the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet 
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would 
not affect the conditions of employment to a sufficiently 
significant degree to violate Title VII".79 
Is the apporach in Vinson still consistent with 
syaing that sexual harassment is in itself illegal under 
Title VII? I submit the answer is yes, and that the 
'strong victim' who is not psychologically or emotionally 
damaged, or otherwise could still bring a successful 
action under Title VII. When Rehnquist J. said the sexual 
harasscient must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" he 
was not concerned with the effect on the complainant, but 
the conduct itself. This is supported by the fact that he 
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held that the respondent's allegations in Vinson included 
not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of 
the most serious nature and were plainly sufficient to 
state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment, 
without making reference in the judgment to any ill 
effects the respondent might, or might not have 
suffered.80 Rehnquist J. rather than saying that sexual 
harassment did not in itself violate Title VII, was to 
some extent defining what will amount to sexual harassment 
for the purposes of Title VII by requiring that the 
conduct, not its effects, be sufficiently severe or 
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and 
create an abusive working environment. It would only be 
natural though, that in the more borderline cases the 
effects might be taken into account in deciding whether 
the conduct itself was sufficiently severe or pervasive. 
The statement in Rogers that a single epithet would not be 
sufficient, is just I suggest, a reflection of the fact, 
as was held in the Australian case of O'Callagahn v 
Loder,81 that a single approach by an employer is unlikely 
to amount to sexual harassment. This is because it is 
unlikely to be, though not necessarily so, sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment. 
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A further, relevant matter was raised in Vinson, by 
the District Court's finding that the respondent was not 
the victim of sexual harassment, as any sex related 
conduct was voluntary. Ths was held to have probably been 
based on one or both of two erroneous views of law. The 
first, which has been dealt with, is the belief that a 
claim for sexual harassment will not lie absent on 
economic effect. The second was the finding of 
voluntariness on the part of the respondent. The court 
held the fact that the sex related conduct was "voluntary'' 
in the sense that the complainant was not forced to 
participate against her will is not a defence to a sexual 
harassment suit brought under Title VII. Rehnquist J. 
held that "the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is 
that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome".82 
The Court of Appeal in holding that voluntariness on 
the part of the respondent was immaterial to her sexual 
harrassment claim, said that it followed from this that 
testimony about the respondent's dress and personal 
fantasies had no place in this litigation. The Supreme 
Court held otherwise because while "voluntariness" in the 
sense of consent is not a defence to such a claim, it does 
not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative 
speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in 
determining whether or not the sexual advances were 
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unwelcome. The court held that to the contrary it is 
obviously relevant, as the record of the whole affair must 
be considered.83 Whilst the relevance can not be 
disputed, the weight it should be accorded may not be so 
great depending on the facts. Thus the court said whilst 
there is no per se rule against its admissibility, any 
marginal relevance of the evidence may be outweighed by 
the potential for unfair prejudice. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
The next jurisdiction to recognize "hostile 
environment" sexual harassment was Northern Ireland. In 
Mortiboys v Crescent Garage Ltd8 4 the tribunal recognised 
that if a work atmosphere is contaminated by sexual 
harassment then there is a term or condition of sex 
discrimination which breaches section 3 of the Employment 
Equality Act 1977 (Nth. Ir). This provides that a person 
discriminates against an employee if he or she does not 
afford that employee the same terms of employment and the 
same working conditions as afforded to another employee by 
reason of sex. The work conditions were held to extend 
beyond the work rules and economic fringes to include 
"psychological fringes" such as work environment.SS 
Similarly in O'Callaghan v Loder86 where the 
plaintiff did not suffer any tangible employment losses 
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from being sexually harassed, the court held that hostile 
environment sexual harassment amounted to discrimination 
because it is a "detriment". This conclusion was reached 
by following the judgment of Brandon L.J. in Ministry of 
Defence v Jeremiah,87 that a complainant has suffered a 
"detriment" when that person has been placed under a 
disadvantage in comparison with employees of the opposite 
sex. The court said that although disadvantage must be a 
matter of substance it is difficult to define limits and 
that it is essentially a matter of fact to be determined 
in each individual case. However, it was said that in the 
context of sexual harassment the type of conduct which 
creates an "unwelcome feature of the employment" and which 
falls under section 25(2)(a) of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977 (N.S.W.), would also lead to a detriment under 
section 25(2)(c) of that act. Section 25(2) provides: 
"It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee on the ground of his sex -
(a) in the terms or conditions of employment which 
he affords him, 
(c) by dismissing him or subjecting him to any other 
detriment". 
The respondent in Loder argued that the words "terms 
or conditions of employment" should be construed narrowly 
so as to include only the terms or conditions of the 
original contract employment as varied by statute, 
regulation or award. Thus it was argued that the terms or 
conditions of the complainant's employment could not be 
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altered unilaterally once employment had begun, so that 
except in the inconceivable event that one of the original 
terms or conditions of a contract of employment related to 
the submission to sexual advances, a complainant alleging 
sexual harassment could have no recourse under that 
section. 
The court had to decide whether to construe "terms or 
conditions of employment" narrowly or broadly so as to 
include those decisions which an employer may make from 
time to time relating to an individual employee. It was 
said that there are innumerable decisions relating to the 
working conditions of the individual employee and to the 
condition of the workplace which must be left to the 
discretion of the individual employer. Therefore a wider 
interpretation allows room for situations in which 
submission to an employer's sexual advance might fall 
within those terms. The court held that because the 
legislation was designed, "as far as legislation could, to 
end intolerance, prejudice and discrimination in the 
community upon the grounds specified in the act, a broad 
liberal approach should be adopted for its interpretation 
rather than a narrow technical one".88 Given the wide 
meaning ascribed to "compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment" in the United States sexual 
harassment cases, and even without those, section 25(2)(a) 
was attributed with the broader meaning. The section 
provides that the terms or conditions are those "which the 
employer affords the employee" and as such was held to 
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clearly relate to the day to day decisions which an 
employer must make in relation to the workplace and to an 
individual employee. The court was also led to this 
decision because section 25(1) of the New South Wales Act 
only applies to certain discriminatory actions of a 
prospective employer before a contract of employment is 
entered into, section 25(2) must deal with situations 
which occur during employment. Furthermore sections 
25(2)(b) and 25(2)(c) only deal with events which can 
occur during employment, promotion, traning, dismissal and 
detriment, therefore it was held that section 25(2)(a) 
must be similarly construed. 
The court noted that American courts taking the 
Rogers, Bundy, and Henson approaches had extended the 
meaning of the words 'term or condition of employment' to 
cover sexual harassment in the workplace regardless of 
whether it led to a loss of tangible job benefits, 
therefore section 25(2)(a) should be interpreted to 
include any substantial matter imposed by an employer 
during the course of employment.89 
The court said that even without the benefit of the 
American cases it would have held section 25(2)(a) to 
cover sexual harassment when an employer indulges in 
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sexual conduct in such a way as to create an unwelcome 
feature of the employrnent.90 This was said to be a 
different way of describing the situations referred to in 
American cases where the pattern of sexual harassment 
inflicted on the employee resulted in his or her being 
subjected to a hostile or demeaning work environment. In 
such circumstances either the unwelcome sexual conduct 
itself, or the hostile or demenaing atmosphere created by 
it, can become such a feature of the employment that it 
can constitute a term or condition of it. To this point 
there is nothing which precludes one from saying, as I 
have suggested it is possible to draw from the United 
States cases, that the unwelcome conduct or sexual 
harassment may be actionable per se, or illegal in 
itself. However, the judgment then went on to say that in 
such a situation an employee need not prove that there 
were any tangible employment consequences as the 
intangible effects are sufficient to invoke the section. 
What is not clear is whether the fact that there is 
discrimination as to the conditions of employment on the 
ground of sex is sufficient "effect", or whether there 
need be further effects to the person discriminated 
against. 
The court said that the sexual conduct of the 
employer can vary from the whole range of sexual contact, 
to purely verbal approaches such as sexual propositions or 
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gender based insults or taunting, but that it is usually 
persistence which would render it unlawful under this 
section. Before it can be invoked the employer must 
create an unwelcome feature of the employment in a 
continuing rather than an isolated sense.91 These 
requirements are arguably no more than just a variety of 
the sufficiently severe or pervasive requirement in the 
United States, and as such requires no further damage than 
the inherent damage that such discrimination creates. 
IX THE NEW ZEALAND POTENTIAL 
How far can or is it likely that the New Zealand 
legislation will be taken? In common with the 
jurisdictions from which the overseas cases cited have 
come, the New Zealand parliament has not spelt out the 
various discriminatory practices nor sought to define 
these many practices such as sexual harassment. The 
dangers of such a course were observed by Judge Goldberg 
in the Rogers9 2 case, and equally apply in New Zealand. 
Ten years ago when the legislation was passed through 
parliament sexual harassment as a term was non existent, 
as was the awareness of its being a discriminatory 
practice. However, this is not to say that it did not 
' 
exist or was not as prevalent, if not more so, than it is 
today. Whilst the legislature when considering the Human 
Rights Commission Bill may not have had sexual harassment 
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specifically in mind, had it been brought to the attention 
of parliament as one of the multifarious forms of sex 
discrimination, it is unlikely that it would have been the 
intention that it not be covered. 
Thus in the H v ~ decision, the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal adopted the gender-plus a pproach from overseas, 
and held sexual harassment resulting in dismissal to be 
illegal except in the unlikely equally treating bi-sexual 
employer situation. Dismissal is however only a tangible 
employment loss. "Detriment" as used in section 15(l)(c) 
will clearly cover other tangible employment losses 
resulting from sexual harassment. Will it, and other 
parts of section 15 go further? 
In considering this question one must consider the 
statutory interpretation approach of the Equal 
Opportunities Tribunal in H v E93 noted earlier, which 
required a liberal and enabling interpretation. On the 
persuasive authority of the overseas cases, and apart from 
them, I submit that "detriment" in section 15(l)(c) must 
outlaw an environment poisoned by sexual harassment, thus 
not requiring any tangible employment loss. Unless this 
is the case all sexually harassing employers need do is to 
ensure that they stop short of dismissing the employee, or 
taking away from that employee, or preventing that 
[A''J L'~"'."" 
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employee from gaining, any tangible job benefits which 
might otherwise have been forthcoming. As said in 
Bundy,94 
The law may allow a woman to prove that her 
resistence to the harassment cost her her job or some 
economic benefit, but this will do her no good if the 
employer never takes such tangible actions against 
her. 
A coercive, or subtle employer may not be affected by a 
victim's refusla, and such a refusal may simply be 
ignored. Thus while the employment in traditional terms 
is left intact, the victim would otherwise not have been 
sexually harassed or at least have no legal recourse 
against that sexual harassment. 
Furthermore New Zealand's obligations under the 
international covenants referred to in H v E would not 
otherwise be satisfied as "just and favourable conditions 
of work" must surely include a work environment free from 
the "detriment'' based on sex, of sexual harassment. 
There is no reason why a narrower interpretation of 
"detriment" should be taken here, than in Jeremiah,95 nor 
why the approach taken in Loder96 to "detriment" and, 
following the United States, the wider hostile environment 
question should not be followed. Both the English and 
Australian legislation provides for "dismissing. . or 
subjecting. . to any other detriment". In Jeremiah the 
r 
L 
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argument that detriment is limited to tangible employment 
losses because "detriment" should be read eujsdem generis 
with "dismissing" was rejected.97 The rejection of such 
an argument follows a fortiori under the New Zealand 
legislation because it reads "dismiss . or subject 
. to any detriment" and thus does not link detriment to 
dismiss by the use of the word "other". 
Although the approaches of the United States courts 
are not binding here, it would be pointless to take a 
restrictive approach so that the lengthy process of 
judicial evolution which occurred in the United States has 
to be repeated here, or so that victims of such 
discrimination have to either get fired or wait for 
legislation intervention. 
Therefore a person subjected to sexual harassment by 
an employer may say that the sexual harassment affected 
and was detrimental to their psychological and emotional 
work environment. If it can be said to have occurred in 
circumstances in which other persons of the opposite sex 
employed by that employer were not, or would not have been 
subjected to such a detriment then the work environment 
was illegally poisoned, contrary to section 15(1)(c) of 
the Human Rights Commission Act. 
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A. Is Sexual Harassment Actionable Per Se 
The next question is then, insofar as this follows 
the United States approach in Bundy and Vinson on the 
hostile environment question, can it be taken a step 
further and be said that as long as there is sexual 
harassment which is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as 
to alter the working conditions and create a hostile 
environment there is a breach of the act; bi-sexual 
harassment excepted? In saying this one is in effect 
limiting the boundaries of sexual harassment for the 
purposes of the act. 
As far as section 15(1)(c) goes it might be argued 
that "detriment" must be construed more narrowly than" . 
. terms, conditions or privileges of employment", in that 
there has to be some proven loss to the harassed person, 
such as emotional effects, before the harassment is 
actionable under the section. If this is the case then 
that loss need not be any more than minor, or perhaps 
other than trivia1.98 However, it can further be argued 
that when sexual harassment is severe or pervasive, or 
persistent unwelcome sexual conduct, it is inherently 
detrim~ntal for the purposes of the section, and it is 
only necessary to look to the conduct of the perpetrator, 
not the effect on the victim. It is more likely than not 
that such sufficiently severe or pervasive sexual 
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harassment will cause lasting psychological and emotional 
effects to the victim. However, even if it does not, the 
fact that it is sufficiently severe or pervasive 
discriminatory behaviour so as to alter the victim's 
working conditions and create a hostile environment means, 
it is argued, that it falls within section 15(l)(c) as 
subjecting that person to a detriment. Thus the behaviour 
of such a reprehensible discriminatory nature is 
actionable per se. The legislation's initial, and I 
believe primary purpose, is to prevent the creation of 
work environments heavily charged with discrimination, in 
this case on the ground of sex. Discrimination is a self 
perpetuating species, and as such should be actionable 
perse when in such a severe form. 
B. Intention and Welcomeness - Are they Relevant? 
The argument so far can be summarised as follows: If 
the sexual conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive so 
as to alter the conditions of work and thereby subject the 
employee to the detriment of having to work in a 
discriminatory hostile environment, the damage is inherent 
in that fact and no reference need be made to any ill 
effects suffered by the victim except for the purposes of 
assessing damages. In the quid pro quo situation where an 
employer has caused the employee to suffer some tangible 
employment loss because the employee has refused to comply 
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with sexual demands, actionable sexual harassment has 
occurred even if the action is not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to be automatically discriminatory. 
It is no defence to a breach of the Human Rights 
Commission Act that the breach was unintentional or 
without negligence.99 Thus for the harasser to say that 
he or she did not intend to dismiss the person or subject 
them to a detriment is irrelevant. In H v ElOO the 
tribunal held that it is an implied term of any contract 
between an employer and employee that, the employer will 
so conduct her or himself that the necessary relationship 
of confidence and trust between them will not be disrupted 
or destroyed. Repudiation of that contract does not have 
to be an intention of the harasser for sexual harassment 
to occur. 
In Loder the court said that a pre-condition of 
liability is that the complainant show both that the 
conduct was unwelcome in fact and that the employer either 
knew or ought to have known of this.101 This is a 
relfection of the fact that sexual harassment is 
predicated on unwelcomeness and that an employer cannot be 
said to be discriminating if the sexual conduct is 
welcome. If it is welcome it can properly be said to be 
outside the employment and not discrimination or sexual 
harassment. 
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However, what if the conduct is unwelcome but the 
defendant says in defence that he or she believed it to be 
welcome and that belief was reasonable? This of itself 
would afford no defence. Nevertheless the conduct would 
not be caught because to be able to say that the 
reasonable person would not have perceived it as unwelcome 
would require the behaviour not to be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive. There are two possibilities: first, either 
the behaviour is sufficiently severe or pervasive to begin 
with, or secondly the behaviour is not sufficiently severe 
or pervasive but becomes so when the victim makes it clear 
it is unwelcome, and the perpetrator persists with it. In 
both cases the reasonable person could not perceive it as 
welcome. 
The following examples illustrate the situations in 
which sexual harassment falls within section 15(1)(c). 
First there is the case where an employer dismisses an 
employee who refuses some sexual relationship with the 
employer. Second there is the H v E situation where an 
employer seriously and pervasively sexually harasses their 
employee until the employee resigns. A constructive 
dismis~al has occurred and the employer is liable. Next 
is the case where an employer makes a sexual proposition 
to the employee, and upon refusal subjects the employee to 
a tangible employment detriment. In these three cases 
there has been a tangible loss to the employee, by reason 
of their sex and for this reason are actionable. 
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Now to the hostile environment situations. If an 
employer subjects an employee to unwelcome sexual conduct 
which is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create 
a hostile working environment it will be sexual harassment 
which is illegal because it inherently subjects the 
employee to a detriment contrary to section 15(1)(c). If 
the behaviour does not create a hostile working 
environment, then of itself it would not fall within 
section 15(1)(c), and the reasonable person would not 
perceive it as unwelcome. However, if the receiver makes 
it clear that it is unwelcome then persistence with the 
conduct will make it sufficiently severe so as to bring 
the perpetrator within section lS(l)(c). Similarly, there 
is no harm in asking but persistence with overtures after 
their unwelcomeness has been made clear brings the 
perpetrator within the sufficiently severe sexual 
harassment range. 
In~ v E & Orsl02 where the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal did not have to consider the circumstances in 
which sexual harassment falls within section 15, it 
nevertheless treated favourably the argument that behviour 
which is alleged to be sexual harassment "must be of a 
serious nature, must be . . unreasonable in all the 
circumstances". On this basis the tribunal held that the 
following alleged acts would not amount to sexual 
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harassment: the fact that a school inspector embarassed a 
teacher by staring at her; the headmaster seeking her 
company in preference to other staff; an accidental or 
innocent touching; a single incident of the headmaster 
standing behind the teacher while she was writing on the 
blackboard; for the headmaster to come close to the 
teacher and smell her hair. The tribunal accepted that 
the last two incidents might have amounted to sexual 
harassment if they were persistent conduct. The 
tribunal's attitude is consistent with the approach I have 
drawn from the overseas cases; none of the individual 
incidents can be described as sufficiently severe or 
pervasive, however persistence might alter this. 
C. Another Possibility - Section 15(1)(b) 
Section 15(l)(b), to some extent at least provides a 
further avenue for victims of sexual harassment. Section 
15 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who is an 
employer, or any person acting or purporting to act 
on behalf of any person who is an employer, 
(a) To refuse or omit to employ any person on work 
of any description which is available and for which 
that person is qualified, or 
(b) To refuse or omit to afford any person the same 
terms of employment, conditions of work, fringe 
benefits, and opportunities for traning, promotion 
and transfer as are made available for persons of the 
same or substantially similar qualifications employed 
in the same or substantially similar circumstances on 
work of that description . . by reason of the sex . 
• of that person. 
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Section lS(l)(a) is apt to cover the situation where 
an employer makes an offer of work conditional on sexual 
favours, and when the employee refuses to engage in sexual 
conduct, the job offer is withdrawn. 
Section lS(l)(b) may be breached when an employer 
secures compliance with her or his sexual demands by 
threatening adverse employment consequences. For example 
the refusal of a fringe benefit which an employee would 
otherwise be entitled to because a request for sexual 
favours made by the employer is denied could be an 
infringement of the section. It would, as already 
established, be a breach of section lS(l)(c) and this may 
be the best avenue. Section lS(l)(b) requires that the 
fringe benefit be one that "[is] made available for" 
certain specified people employed by that employer, thus 
it appears on a literal reading of the section it is not 
sufficient that the fringe benefit ''would" be made 
available for those other employees if they existed. This 
is in comparison with the wording of section lS(l)(c) 
which, as mentioned and dealt with earlier, provides that 
"other persons employed. . are not or would not be 
dismissed . " thus they are not actually required to 
exist. Therefore section lS(l)(b) appears to require that 
a person is being discriminated against, by reason of one 
of the grounds provided, when compared with certain people 
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whom that employer actually employs. If this is so then 
the facts of H v E would not fall within the section, 
prior to dismissal, as the plaintiff was the only employee 
of the defendant and there was no one with whom she may be 
compared to say she is getting different treatment. 
Section 15(1)(b) is not mentioned in the judgment in H v 
~, though the plaintiffs made the poisoned environment 
argument, and that may be because of the reason just 
mentioned. It would seem that section 15(1)(b) is 
designed to deal with differentiation by reason of the 
prohibited grounds on certain specified matters between 
employees of the same employer, whereas section lS(l)(c) 
deals with the abstract discrimination situations. This 
appears to be the only explanation for having the words 
"are made" in one subsection and "are not or would not" in 
the other. 
In the situation where it can be shown that one 
employee has been sexually harassed, and another employee 
"of the same or substantially similar qualifications 
employed in the same or substantially similar 
circumstances on work of that description", who is of the 
opposite sex was not, the employer may have breached 
section 15(1)(b). This would depend on how "terms of 
employment" and "conditions of work" were to be 
construed. They would clearly cover any tangible 
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differences, and I submit that they must also cover other 
differences, such as a hostile work environment created by 
the sexual harassment. There is no significant difference 
between the words of the United States statute, "terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment", or the New South 
Wales statute, "compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment", which would justify a contrary 
approach to that taken in those jurisdictions. Thus where 
there has been unwanted sexual conduct by an employer 
which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create 
different conditions of work to those of another employee 
as described by the section, or so as to become a term of 
the persons employment, then it may be said the employer 
has either refused or omitted, depending on the facts, to 
afford that person the same terms and conditions. There 
would be no requirement that the employee has actually 
suffered any ill effects or loss just, as required in 
Vinson, that the sexual harassment is of the required 
severity. However, invariably it will be easier to bring 
an action under section 15(1)(c). 
D. Locus Standi and Procedure 
Given the conclusion I have reached that sexual 
harassment is in itself actionable, and requires no 
further damage who can bring an action under section 15? 
Does it have to be the person discriminated against, or 
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can it be someone who just objects to working in a 
dis~riminatory environment? Section 34 of the Human 
Rights Commission Act requires the commission to 
investigate, and conciliate where a breach has occurred, 
and this may be done either on complaint or of its own 
motion. There is nothing in the Act which would prevent a 
person from complaining that someone else in their work 
environment was sexually harassed. Then it is at the 
commission's discretion as to whether it investigates the 
complaint, according to section 35 of the act. Should the 
commission investigate the complaint, it will then advise 
the parties of the outcome of its investigations. If the 
commission is of the opinion that the complaint has 
substance it will, according to Section 37 of the act, 
mediate between the parties, and attempt to secure a 
settlement. If it is unsure whether the complaint has 
substance but is of the opinion that it should be 
proceeded with it shall follow the same mediation 
process. If no settlement is reached, or if it is 
breached, the matter is referred to the Proceedings 
Commissioner who decides whether proceedings should be 
instituted against the person about whom the complaint was 
made. ' That person is given an opportunity to be heard 
before the commissioner. If the Proceedings Commissioner 
decides to pursue the matter then the Commissioner may 
according to section 38 of the act bring civil proceedings 
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before the Equal Opportunities Tribunal, otherwise the 
Commissioner may let the matter rest. The same procedure 
would follow if the Commission decided to investigate a 
particular matter of its own accord. 
Section 38(4) of the act provides that:-
" . the aggrieved person (if any) may himself 
bring proceedings before the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal if he wishes to do so, and -
(a) The Commission or the Proceedings Commissioner 
is of the opinion that the complaint does not have 
substance or that the matter ought not to be 
proceeded with; or 
(b) In a case where the Proceedings Commissioner 
would be entitled to bring proceedings, the 
Proceedings Commissioner -
(i) Agrees to the aggrieved person bringing 
proceedings; or 
(ii) Declines to take proceedings". 
It is clear that anyone can make a complaint but should 
the Proceedings Commissioner, or the Commission not find 
substance to the claim not just anyone can take it 
further. Only an "aggrieved person" may bring proceedings
 
themselves. The question then, is who is an "aggrieved 
person"? 
In New Zealand Freedom From Discrimination Group v 
New Zealand Grand Lodge of Freemasons,103 the tribunal had
 
to consider the point. The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant was unlawfully discriminating because by reasons
 
of undertakings and obligations Freemasons grant 
preference in employment to fellow Masons and undertake to
 
espouse the cause of fellow Masons when called upon to do 
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so whether the cause be just or unjust. The plaintiff's 
agreed that no single member of the group could point to 
any breach specifically committed against him or her. Nor 
could they point to any breach against the group as a 
whole. Their complaint was that there was discrimination 
against all non-Masons. The plaintiffs accepted that 
neither the group nor any member of it could say they were 
any more aggrieved than any other group or person and that 
they had no evidence to show a specific breach of the Act 
against the group or any individual member. 
The question was whether the plaintiff was an 
"aggrieved person". The term is susceptible to both a 
wide and narrow interpretation. In some cases it may be 
desirable to allow proceedings to be taken by persons who 
have suffered no direct or provable personal grievance, 
but believe there is discrimination affecting the public 
generally. However, there are also cases where "people 
who would generally be regarded as busybodies or as 
pursuing warped or groundless allegations" wish to take 
proceedings, thus requiring some restriction. 
Section 38(2) of the Act gives the Commission the 
right to bring proceedings on behalf of a class of 
persons, therefore the legislation has provided for the 
protection of a class of persons where appropriate. The 
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tribunal said "aggrieved person" must be interpreted in 
light of the provisions of the Act as applied to the facts 
of the individual case, and did not wish to make a ruling 
which covers every case. 
The plaintiffs submitted that the words "(if any)" in 
section 38(4) indicate that there is no need for a person 
proceeding under that subsection to have suffered any 
personal grievance or to be in any way connected with 
those who suffer from the discriminatory practice, apart 
from such interest as any member of the public might have. 
The tribunal, and I submit quite properly, held that 
the only possible interpretation is that it entitles the 
aggrieved person, if there is such a person, to bring the 
proceedings. It held, that the term should not be defined 
or interpreted in an unduly restrictive manner, such as a 
strict legal, financial or other direct grievance, but 
does mean more than "any person". The aggrieved person 
must be in some way differentiated from the generality of 
people or the public, and each case must be decided on its 
facts. The plaintiffs in the case were held to be too 
remote and not sufficiently connected with any alleged 
discrimination on the part of the defendant. 
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What then of the situation where an employer 
seriously sexually harasses an employee thereby breaching 
section 15 of the Act, but the employee does not her or 
himself wish to take any action, or is not even offended 
by it? The latter scenario is unlikely, but in both cases 
I would suggest that another employee, possibly even the 
same sex as the harasser, could be one of the people 
aggrieved by the discrimination, and fall within section 
38(2). The other person may object to having to work in a 
discriminatory environment and thus could be 
differentiated from the generality of people as being 
connected with the person against whom the discrimination 
was directed. 
The advantage of having sexual harassment actionable 
per se is that while this severe and pervasive 
discriminatory conduct might have little effect on one 
very strong victim, it could have devastating effects on a 
weaker, or even average victim. Therefore to allow the 
behaviour to go unchecked is dangerous. Where there is 
little or no actual damage to the victim, damages would be 
appropriately reduced. The effects on the perpetator of 
having ,a sexual harassment action brought against them 
should be enough to discourage further such conduct. 
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X SEXIST HARASSMENT 
The emphasis to date has been on sexual harassment, 
however the terms of the Human Rights Commission Act do 
not require the conduct to be sexual, but by reason of 
sex. It has been held that where it is sexual, it is 
substantially by reason of sex. In Hill v Water Resources 
Commissionl04 where the harassment was not sexual, the 
court held that harassment based on the sex of the victim 
amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex. Hill, a 
woman was subjected to a series of acts and comments at 
work, instigated by male employees, which increased in 
intensity and unpleasantness over time. The behaviour 
included sexist remarks, offensive literature arriving in 
the mail, similarly offensive literature aimed at her 
being placed on notice boards, offensive phone calls, 
throwing objects to her with unnecessary force, and 
threats to kill fish she kept in a bowl on her desk. 
The plaintiff was the first woman in her branch as a 
graded clerical officer and the men resented her 
intrusion, and for that reason subjected her to the 
harassment. The court noted that ''sexual harassment" is a 
term which does not appear in the New South Wales Act; 
and nor, does it appear in the New Zealand Act. The court 
held that the test is whether a comparable man would have 
been similarly harassed. As this was answered in the 
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negative, it was held that the treatment was on the ground 
of sex, and amounted to discriminatory sex based 
harassment. 
A similar case in New Zealand would fall within the 
terms of section 15. If it can be shown that the 
harassment was sexist, or harassment which could be, or 
was, perpetrated on the victim only because of the 
victim's gender, then it may be said that the dismissal or 
detriment, or different terms of employment or conditions 
of work occurred by reason of sex. 
XI SUPERVISOR LIABILITY 
Section 15 provides that it is not only the employer 
who is liable, but also "any person acting or purporting 
to act on behalf of any person who is an employer". Where 
the dismissal, or subjection to detriment, or refusal to 
afford the same terms of employment is carried out by 
someone who has been delegated the authority to stand in 
the position of the employer, then it will fall within the 
section. If the person purports to act on behalf of the 
employer, and notwithstanding they do not have the actual 
authority to do so, dismisses a person or subjects a 
person to any detriment within the term of section 15, 
then the person so purporting to act will be liable. 
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One situation that has been mentioned as falling 
outside the terms of section lS(l)(c) is the equally 
treating bi-sexual employer case. A similarly unlikely 
situation which it appears would not be covered is as 
follows: Assume there are two employees, one male and one 
female, who both do the same work. The employer who is 
male sexually harasses the female employee so as to 
subject her to a detriment and the supervisor who is 
female sexually harasses the male employee so as to 
subject him to a detriment. Neither of the employees 
could claim they had been subjected to a detriment, in 
circumstances in which other persons employed by that 
employer on work of that description are not subjected to 
such detriment by reason of their sex. This unlikely 
possibility points to some tension in applying section 15 
to sexual harassment. This is because of the requirement 
that for sexual harassment to be actionable a comparison 
of treatment accorded to the different sexes must be 
undertaken, rather than simply saying sexual harassment 
which subjects the employee to a detriment is actionable. 
XII VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Section 33 of the Act provides that anything done or 
omitte~ as the employee or agent of another person shall 
be treated as done or omitted by that other person, as 
well as by the first-mentioned person whether or not it 
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was done with that other person's knowledge. Therefore 
where a supervisor or other employee commits a breach 
within the terms of section 15 by sexually harassing 
another employee, the employer will be prima-facie liable 
also. 
However section 33(3) provides a defence to the 
employer, if the employer can prove that he or she took 
steps that were reasonably practicable to prevent the 
employee from doing the act, or from doing as an employee 
of that person acts of that description. This defence 
does not apply in relation to agents. In Human Rights 
Commission v Eric Sides Motors Company Limited,lOS the 
tribunal held that the effect of this defence is to excuse 
an employer for any act of an employer, whether negligent, 
unintentional or otherwise as long as the employer took 
the appropriate steps. 
The effect of section 33(3) will be to allow an 
employer who sets up an internal complaints procedure and 
sufficiently advises all employees of the illegality of 
sexual harassment, and what it is, to argue in any action 
brought against them that the employer took steps that 
were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from 
doing the act. In its policy statement on sexual 
harassment,106 the Human Rights Commission said that 
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employers have a responsibility to ensure that all 
employees are informed that sexual harassment in the 
workplace will not be tolerated, and further that 
employees should also be made aware of whom they can go to 
within an organisation if they are being subjected to such 
behaviour. 
If on the facts it can be said that the employer had 
done everything reasonable to prevent the sexual 
harassment, then the employer will not be held liable. 
Often the sexual harassment will involve the perpetrator 
being in a position of power over the employee, however a 
hostile environment situation may be perpetrated by a 
fellow employee. If that is the case, that employee would 
not be liable under section 15 because they could not be 
said to be acting or purporting to act on behalf of any 
person who is an employer. Nevertheless, the employer may 
be liable for the employee's acts under section 15. This 
would be so if it could be shown that the employer knew 
about the harassment and took no steps to rectify the 
situation thereby subjecting the employee to a detriment, 
or constructively dismissing the employee within the terms 
of section 15(1)(c), or refusing or omitting to offer the 
employee the same terms of employment or conditions of 
work within the terms of section 15(l)(b). It could be 
taken even further, and said that an employer by not 
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setting up a complaints procedure had thereby subjected 
the employee to a detriment within the terms of section 
lS(l)(c). 
In any reform it would not be desirable to extend the 
legislation so as to cover the fellow-employee situation. 
Where one employee (who is not employed in any type of 
supervisory capacity) sexually harasses another employee 
there is no power relationship. The harassed employee may 
complain to the employer who is required to take the 
appropriate action. This can be done before the conduct 
reaches serious proportions. Should the employer not act, 
then the employer will be liable for any hostile 
environment which ensues. 
Similarly should an employee sexually harass an 
employer the employer does not need protection as the 
employer is in the position of power and would be 
perfectly justified in dismissing the employee. 
XIII PROCEDURES UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1973 
Section 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 sets 
up a procedure whereby an employee may bring an action 
against their employer if they have a personal grievance 
related to their employment. Section 117(1) provides: 
For the purposes of this section the expression 
"personal grievance" means any grievance that a 
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worker may have against his employer b
ecause of a 
claim that he has been unjustifiably d
ismissed, or 
that other action by the employer (not
 being an 
action of a kind applicable generally 
to workers of 
the same class employed by the employe
r) affects his 
employment to his disadvantage. 
As the grievance procedure is a model 
deemed to have been 
included in every collective instrumen
t,107 it operates as 
a clause of the instrument and its ben
efit can be claimed 
only by a worker whose employment is c
overed by an award 
or collective agreement.108 There rem
ains some doubt as 
to whether the employee actually needs 
to be a union 
member at the time of incurring the pe
rsonal 
grievance.109 What is clear is that an
y applicability the 
personal grievance procedure has to se
xual harassment is 
limited to only some employees. 
Where an employee considers they have 
a personal 
grievance against their employer, they
 must follow the 
procedure set out in their award, or if
 there is none the 
procedure implied by section 117(4). 
The initial 
complaint goes to the workers immediat
e supervisor under 
section 117(4)(6) or, where this is no
t appropriate, to a 
union representative who takes the mat
ter up on their 
behalf. If at this stage the matter is
 not resolves, a 
grievance committee is formed to attem
pt to settled, it is 
referred to the Arbitration Court. 
•• 
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The Arbitration Court has consistently held that an 
apparent resignation can also amount to a dismissa1,llO 
the approach approved in the Woolworthslll case referred 
to earlier. Thus in H v ~ the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal accepted on the authority of Woolworths that the 
plaintiff had been constructively dismissed, where she had 
resigned following sexual harassment of increasing 
intensity by her employer.112 Such behaviour would 
clearly amount to an unjustified dismissal under section 
117(1). As the behaviour leading to the constructive 
dismissal is a breach of an implied term of the employment 
contract,113 it may therefore be said to be unjustified. 
Furthermore Somers J. in Auckland City Council v Hennessey 
said, 
The word 'unjustifiably' in section 117(1) is 
not confined to matters of legal justification . 
In the context of section 117 we think the word 
'unjustified' should have its ordinary accepted 
meaning. Its integral feature is the word 'unjust' 
that is to say not in accordance with justice or 
fairness. A cuase of action is unjustifiable when 
that which is done cannot be shown to be in 
accordance with justice or fairness.1 14 
There can be no doubt that sexual harassment which causes 
someone to resign, amounts to an unjustifiable dismissal. 
To what extent may sexual harassment be said to be a 
disadvantage under section 117(1)? It would have to be 
shown that it was the employer sexually harassing, or that 
the employer's action caused the sexual harassment. 
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Furthermore it must be shown that it was not an action of 
a kind applicable generally to workers of the same class 
employed by that employer. It would be difficult for 
employers to defend themselves by saying that generally 
all employees were sexually harassed, though may be easier 
in an all female work environment. Finally it is 
necessary to show that the sexual harassment affected the 
employment to the employees disadvantage. 
The Arbitration Court has consistently construed 
disadvantage as tangible, or economic employment related 
disadvantage. Thus in New Zealand Shipping Officers 
I.U.W. v Union Steamship Co Ltd,115 where a worker was 
relocated on the same salary in the service of the same 
employer, Jamieson J. held that notwithstanding the 
worker's pride had been hurt in his eyes by being given 
work which he regarded as reducing his status, there was 
no disadvantage because he suffered no reduction in 
salary, retirement rights or in any other material 
respects. Similarly in NZ Nurses I.U.W. v Royal NZ 
Plunket Society (Inc. )116 Castle J. held a forced transfer 
did not affect employment to the worker's disadvantage as 
she had not suffered in any material respects because her 
rate of pay remained the same, the appropriate award 
entitlements were retained, and her continuity of 
employment was not affected. 
• I 
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On the authority of this line of cases a sexually 
harassed employee would only have been disadvantaged where 
they had lost pay, or some other tangible employment 
benefits, but not emotional and other effects from being 
sexually harassed. The Court of Appeal may be prepared to 
widen "disadvantage" if a case of sexual harassment was 
taken to that stage. 
In any case the present Arbitration Court line does 
not prevent a worker from raising sexual harassment as a 
personal grievance and taking it to the grievance 
committee stage, where a settlement could be reached 
notwithstanding the wording of the act. Whilst this has 
been done, though never been taken to the Arbitration 
Court, it is not the most desirable method of dealing with 
the matter from the employee's point of view as it 
requires confronting the harasser. The grievance 
committee procedure is designed for tackling tangible 
employee employer disputes, not personal violations of 
this type. 
Should a sexual harassment case be dealt with under 
this procedure, either the parties may settle on such 
remedies as they wish, or the court under section 
117(4)(i) may make a decision or award by way of final 
settlement. If the case involves an unjustifiable 
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dismissal, then section 117(7) applies and the employee 
may be reimbursed for lost wages, reinstated, and/or 
compensated. An employee who was constructively dismissed 
following sexual harassment by their employer is unlikely 
to want to be reinstated. However as to compensation, in 
McHardy v St. John Ambulance Associationll7 the 
Arbitration Court said "the act lays down no guidelines 
. as to the manner in which compensation should be 
assessed". On this ground Arbitration Court decisions 
have taken account of hurt feelings, humiliation,
118 loss 
of dignity and like grounds which the common law under the 
rule in Addis v Gramaphone Co. Ltd11 9 does not recognise 
as proper heads for damages in an action for breach of 
contract by wrongfully dismissing an employee. Such 
matters would be prevalent in a case of sexual harassment, 
however awards have been for relatively small amounts. 
XIV BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In Woolworthsl20 the Court of Appeal held that in New 
Zealand a term recognising that there ought to be a 
relationship of confidence and trust may be implied as a 
normal incidence of the relationship of employer and 
employee. On the strength of that the tribunal in~ v 
El21 held that it is an implied term of any employment 
contract, that both parties will so conduct themselves 
that the necessary relationship of confidencB and trust 
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between them will not be disrupted and destroyed, and 
furthermore sexual harassment of an employee by an 
employer breaches that term. There is no reason why this 
approach should not be upheld in a contract action by an 
employee against their employer. 
Thus there are two possibilities for an employee, an 
action for wrongful dismissal after the employee has 
resigned, and an action for breach of this implied term at 
either stage. Wrongful dismissal at common law, is 
dismissal without proper notice, where peremptorily and 
without justification, an employer dismisses an employee. 
Although in a sexual harassment case the employee may not 
have actually been dismissed, there may be a constructive 
dismissal by the employee because a breach of duty by the 
employer lead the worker to resign,1 22
 and will clearly be 
wrongful. Where an employer has actually dismissed the 
employee because the employee has refused a sexual 
relationship, there is no doubt that the dismissal is 
wrongful for want of justification, and that a contract 
action may follow. 
The difficulty the employee faces is in the damages 
' 
that are recoverable. The remedies for breach of an 
employment contract are similar to but not exactly the 
same as the remedies available for breach of an ordinary 
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contract. In Radford v De Froberville the court said: 
As to principle, I take my starting point from what, 
I think, is the universal statement of Parke Bin 
Robinson v Harmanl23 . . which is in these terms: 
"The rule of common law is, that where a party 
sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he 
is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the 
same situation with respect to damages, as if the 
contract had been performed.124 
Therefore in an action for wrongful dismissal the 
prima facie measure of damages will be a sum equivalent to 
wages which would have been earned between the time of 
actual termination and the time at which the contract 
might lawfully have been terminated by proper notice, and 
including the value of any fringe benefits which the 
employee would have received during the same period. 
is qualified by a duty on the employee to mitigate the 
losses suffered by attempting to find new employment. 
This 
The difficulty is that where dismissal arises out of 
sexual harassment by the employer, the employee is likely 
to have suffered emotional and psychological effects, or 
at the least anxiety, frustration and worry. However in 
Addis v Gramaphone Co Ltd12 S the House of Lords held that 
the employee is not entitled to additional compensation 
for loss arising from the manner of dismissal, thus 
damages can not be given for shock, worry, anxiety, 
embarrassment, humiliation or mental and emotional pain. 
In Addis a company manager was wrongfully dismissed in a 
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way that was harsh and humiliating, but could not recover 
damages for injury to his feelings. Subsequently many 
cases have qualified the Addis ruling and Treite1126 says 
in view of all these qualifications, the continued 
existence of the rule may be in doubt. However, in Vivian 
v Coca-Cola Export Corporation,127 Prichard J. held the 
cases which qualify Addis were distinguishable from the 
instant case and do not derogate from the Addis principle 
in its application to service contracts, and so the 
plaintiff could not recover for shock, worry, anxiety, 
upset and disappointment following wrongful dismissal. 
Therefore a sexually harassed employee who brings an 
action in contract against their employer for wrongful 
dismissal will not, on the authority of Vivian, be able to 
recover damages for any emotional effects caused by the 
manner of dismissal. 
However, is this the case if the actio·n is for breach 
of the implied term referred to earlier? Prichard J. in 
Vivianl28 said the rule in Addis excluding damages for 
intangible injuries is stated in terms which suggest that 
the rule is absolute and unqualified and that it applies 
to all claims for breach of contract. However as Prichard 
J. also recongised the rule is subject to qualifications 
or exceptions.129 
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Princhard J. identified three categories.130 Where 
the plaintiff can show that actual pecuniary loss has 
resulted from loss of reputation; where the plaintiff has 
suffered pain or real physical inconvenience; and finally 
a specific contractual undertaking to protect or enhance 
the plaintiff's reputation or provide the plaintiff with 
some amenity or source of enjoyment. As to this last 
category, it was said tht this is on a different footing 
from the type of case dealt with in Vivian, where the only 
specific undertakings broken are promises to pay a salary 
for services to be rendered and not to terminate the 
employment without proper notice. An action for a breach 
of the implied term of the contract employment held to 
exist in H v ~, because of the sexual harassment of the 
employer, is far removed from those specific undertakings, 
but rather can be viewed as an undertaking by the employer 
to provide the employee with some amenity, namely a work 
environment free of sexual harassment by the employer, 
thereby maintaining the relationship of confidence and 
trust. The direct result of a breach of this term would 
be injury to feelings, and emotional effects as compared 
with wrongful dismissal where the direct and immediate 
effect is lost wages. 
All the cases cited in Vivian from New Zealand courts 
which applied Addis dealt with contract actions for 
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wrongful dismissa1.131 Also cited was Cox v Phillips 
Industries Ltd,132 where the plaintiff in an action for 
breach of contract was permitted to recover damages 
because the breach exposed him to a good deal of 
depression, vexation, frustration and ill health. 
Although it was made clear that because of Addis the 
plaintiff could not have recovered damges in an action for 
wrongful dismissal for those intangible effects, the 
plaintiff was not so precluded because the promise broken 
by the employer was a promise to give the plaintiff a 
position of greater responsibility which went beyond a 
mere obligation to pay wages. The court held that there 
is no reason in principle why, if a situation arises which 
within the contemplation of the parties would have given 
rise to vexation, distress, frustration, and general 
disappointment the person who suffers from the contractua l 
breach should not be compensated in damages for that 
breach.133 The court, by reference to the Hadley v 
Baxendalel3 4 test of remoteness, held it to be a case 
where it was in the contemplation of the parties in all 
the circumstances that, if that promise of a position of 
better responsibility without reasonable notice was 
breached then, the effect of that breach would be to 
expose the plaintiff to the degree of vexation, 
frustration, and distress which he in fact underwent. 
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In Vivian the plaintiff argued, that because the 
injured feelings and the like came within the Hadley v 
Baxendale test of remoteness, they were recoverable. 
Prichard J.135 rejected this saying that whilst Hadley v 
Baxendale is one limitation on damages, Addis is another 
limitation altogether. He said: 
In essence, it is a statement of the legal policy 
"preventing" as Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said in 
Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd: . the intrusion of not 
a few matters of prejudice hither to introduced for 
the inflation of damages in cases of wrongful 
dismissal [which are] now definitely declared to be 
irrelevant and inadmissible on that issue.136 
In my submission, however, none of the foregoing 
would preclude and may rather support a court saying that 
in a contract action against an employer, who had sexually 
harassed their employee, for breach of the implied term 
referred to in Woolworthsl37 and~ v ~,138 the employee 
may recover damages for injured feelings and similarly 
intangible effects caused by the breach as long as the 
case comes within the Hadley v Baxendale
13 9 test for 
remoteness. As such effects are those which would 
normally flow from a breach of this implied term, and be 
in the reasonable contemplation of the parties as a 
consquence of breach, the remoteness test should present 
no obstacle. It may be said, I submit, that the Addis 
rule will only prevent a sexually harassed employee from 
recovering such damages, if they ground their action on 
wrongful dismissal. 
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XV A TORT ACTION? 
The common law provices_ a further avenue of action 
for some victims of sexual harassment. Trespass to the 
person, or more particularly a battery or assault, will 
give the victim the right of bringing a tort action 
against the perpetrator. This is of course not restricted 
to the employment situation and will cover harassment in 
all areas. 
A. Battery 
A battery involves one person intentionally touching 
another without consent and no physical injury need 
result. The insult of the violation will suffice. Thus 
in Cole v Turner it was said that "The least touching of 
another in anger is a battery"l40 as would be fondling or 
kissing another person without their consent. Contacts 
associated with every day life in the office would not 
amount to a battery, however continually brushing ones 
body against another persons after it has been made known 
that this is resented may do. As battery is an 
intentional tort it would be necessary to show that such 
brushing was intended, rather than being part of the 
necessary contact in a crowded workplace. 
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B. Assault 
As for the tort of assault no contact is required. 
Rather it is necessary that one person intentionally 
causes another person to apprehend imminent unwanted 
contact. One can readily imagine the manager moving 
towards his secretary, who is backing away into the 
corner, as he suggests that she might like to comply with 
is sexual demands. In such a case the secretary would 
have due cause to apprehend such contact. Should the 
contact then actually occur, both an assault and battery 
would have been committed. Where the weak victim has 
apprehended a physical violation which the reasonable 
victim would not have, then usually there will be no 
assault.141 However, where a strong victim does not 
apprehend an imminent violation, which the reasonable 
victim would have, then an actionable assault will still 
have occurred. 
C. The Effect of Accident Compensation 
Section 27(1) of the Accident Compensation Act 1982 
provides that where any person suffers a personal injury 
by accident in New Zealand no proceedings for damages 
arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or death 
shall be brought in any court independently of that Act. 
For the purposes of the Act an accident has occurred 
notwithstanding that the perpetrator intentionally injured 
the victim. 
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The question therefore arises as to what e
xtent may a 
victim of sexual harassment rely on the to
rts of assault 
and battery. In an assault as there h
as been no physical 
contact there is no question of physical in
jury. 
Potentially there may be mental injury, fo
r which no 
compensatory claim may be made by way of a
n action for 
assault. However, an action may be brough
t because of the 
fact of being assaulted as it is actionable
 per se, though 
damages may not compensate for any persona
l injury. 
In the case of a battery no tort action ma
y be 
brought to recover compensation for any ph
ysical injury 
suffered, however this will not prevent an 
action. In 
~ v McKnightl42 the respondent was suspected of shop 
lifting and the appellant a store detective
 stopped him, 
placed his hands on the respondent and aske
d him for a 
receipt. The respondent who was completed 
innocent sued 
the appellant. At first instance it was h
eld that there 
was a technical offence. On appeal the co
urt further held 
that in respect of an assault and battery 
damages can be 
awarded not only for physical injury but a
lso in respect 
of insult which may arise from interefence
 with the person 
and the injury to his feelings, that is the
 indignity, 
' 
mental suffering, disgrace and humiliation
 that may be 
caused. Thus while compensation may no lo
nger be given 
for physical injury, compensation for inju
ry to feelings 
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is not necessarily precluded. Section 2 o
f the Accident 
Compensation Act provides that personal injury by ac
cident 
includes the physical and mental consequences of the
 
accident. Whilst this catches mental suffering, em
otional 
effects such as indignity, disgrace, humiliation and
 the 
like are not precluded and may be compensated for in
 a 
trespass action. Such effects are likely where ass
ault 
and or battery have occurred in the context of sexu
al 
harassment. 
D. Intentional Infliction of Nervous Shock 
At common law recognition is given to the tort of 
intentional infliction of nervous shock. In Wilkins
on v 
Downtonl43 the court held the defendant was liable w
here 
he had wilfully done an act calculated to cause harm
 to 
the plaintiff and caused her physical harm through n
ervous 
shock which rendered her ill. Similarly in New Zea
land 
Herdman J. in Stevenson v Bashaml44 held the defend
ant 
liable where he intended to frighten the plaintiff i
nto 
giving up possession of a house and in trying to do 
so 
caused the plaintiff nervous shock. In Wilkinson the
re 
was much evidence that the act was done as a practic
al 
joke, and in Stevenson the aim was to obtain possess
ion of 
the 'house. Nevertheless in both cases the courts w
ere 
prepared to impute to the defendants an intention to
 cause 
nervous shock to the plaintiffs, becau-se it was suff
ered. 
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In a harassment situation it would not usually be the 
case that the perpetrator intended nervous shock. This 
would be so in most actions for this tort. The usual 
intention is to cause "purely mental distress in the form 
of fright, fear, horror, grief, shame, anger, 
embarassment, disappointment, humiliation, injured pride 
or wounded feelings".145 Nevertheless in circumstances 
where the actual effect has been nervous shock or physical 
illness the courts have imputed to the defendant an 
intention to cause that shock or injury. 
In the "sexist harassment" case of Hill v Water 
Resources Commissionl46 the plaintiff was subjected for a 
lengthy period to a hostile and offensive work 
environment. A particular episode was identified as being 
a significant factor in the development of a psychological 
condition suffered by the plaintiff. The episode 
described in the case as "a form of mental cruelty" 
involved constant threats of feeding the complainants fish 
to bigger fish in a tank at the office, or to eat her fish 
themselves. On one particular day, Hill was told her fish 
had been fed to the bigger ones. The plaintiff became 
verj upset and eventually left in tears. It was not until 
her arrival at work the following week that she found her 
fish were alive and the whole thing had been a cruel 
hoax. The court was in no doubt that, placed in the 
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background of all the other harassment inciden
ts Hill was 
subjected to, the nature of this act was calcu
lated to, 
and did, subject Hill to alarm, distress and h
umiliation. 
This incident placed in the context of a string
 of 
incidents, and other harassment, resulted in st
ress caused 
psychological disability, manifested in nervous
 and 
physical symptoms requiring ongoing medical and
 
counselling treatment. 
Such a situation has the potential for forming 
the 
basis of an action for the tort of intentional 
infliction 
of nervous shock. However in New Zealand there
 would be a 
problem with accident compensation. From the v
ictim's 
point of view the suffering was a result of an 
accident. 
In Hill's case there was a serious of specific 
and 
ascertainable "accidents" which were followed b
y an injury 
which may have been the consequence of any or 
all of 
them. The precise injury need not be located. 
It matters 
not that the injury was caused by the delibera
te act of 
another person. 
As to the injury itself, it would fall wtihin 
the 
"mental consequences" of the accident as provid
ed in 
section 2 of the Accident Compensation Act. N
ervous shock 
is "any recognizable psychiatric illness"l47 an
d therefore 
part of the "mental consequences'' of the accid
ent. Thus 
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section 27 of the Accident Compensation Act is a bar to 
any action for compensatory damages for the intentional 
infliction of nervous shock. 
E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
If a victim of sexual harassment does not suffer from 
''any recognizable psychiatriatric illness" as a result of 
the harassment, nor is assaulted, but nevertheless suffers 
some emotional distress, can this be the subject of an 
action against the perpetrator? 
Fleming says there must be "objective and 
substantially harmful physical or psychopathological 
consequences, such as an actual illness
11 .148 This is just 
a statement of the need for a recognised psychiatric 
illness before an action for the intentional infliction of 
nervous shock can be brought. However, Fleming goes on to 
say that the common law is "not yet prepared to protect 
emotional security as such except in the . . case of 
assault.1 49 On this basis fright or hurt feelings would 
not suffice. 
Certainly there is no clear authority that an action 
for damages may be brought for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress by itself, but also there is no 
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authoritative decision, binding on the New Zealand courts, 
which holds that damages are not available for the 
intentional infliction of purely emotional distress. 
As discussed, in~ v McKnightlSO where the 
plaintiff was assaulted damages were awarded for the 
infliction of emotional distress, because of insult and 
injury to feelings suffered.151 But in the sexual 
harassment case where there is no direct threat of bodily 
contact this action would not be available. Yet it would 
seem incongruous that damages for intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress be only available where their 
infliction has occurred in conjunction with an assault, or 
other tort. Perhaps it may sometimes be easier to show or 
impute such an intention when coupled with an assault. 
However, where a person is severely sexually harassed, 
though not assaulted, and suffers severe emotional 
distress an intention to inflict that distress may be 
readily imputed to the harasser. 
As has also been mentioned the courts prior to 
Accident Compensation were prepared to give damages for 
intentionally inflicted nervous shock.152 Should not the 
plaintiff be able to succeed if the only effect suffered 
was severe emotional distress rather than physical injury 
or nervous shock? 
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Trindade and Canel53 suggests that the courts should 
grant an action on the case for damages for the 
intentional infliction of purely emotional distress by 
drawing an analogy with Wilkinson v Downton,154 which was 
followed in New Zealand by Stevenson v Basham.155 If a 
defendant intentionally inflicts emotional distress, 
damages should be recoverable for the same reasons they 
were for intentional infliction of nervous shock. 
There should be no difficulty in establishing and 
quantifying loss where injured feelings, humiliation and 
other forms of emotional distress have been inflicted. If 
this can be done where there is an assault, it can be done 
where there is not. 
If such an action is allowable the plaintiff would 
have to prove that the defendant did the act(s) or made 
the statement(s) with the intention of causing the 
emotional distress to the plaintiff. Thus the defendant 
must have meant to do it and possibly have known that the 
distress was certain or substantially certain to follow 
from the defendant's conduct.156 This intention may be 
imputed in the same way as it was in Stevenson v 
Basham:157 
Furtnermore there must be emotional distress. 
Trinade and Cane says there "must be serious mental 
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distress, substantial and enduring rather than transient, 
[though] it should not be necessary that the mental 
distress produce physical harm or nervous shock in order 
to be labelled 'serious 111 .158 In the United States it was 
said that "Serious mental distress may be found where a 
reasonable [person] normally constituted would be unable 
to adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by 
the circumstances of the case".159 Furthermore the act or 
statement may need to be of a kind reasonably capable of 
causing emotional distress to the reasonable person, 
unless the defendant is aware of the plaintiffs 
peculiarities.160 
One can readily imagine the hostile environment 
situation where a person is continually and insidiously 
verbally sexually harassed to the extent that the 
reasonable person would be unable to cope. The behaviour 
may also include acts of a sexual nature, though there is 
no assault. The effects may be anxiety, sleeplessness, 
sexual inhibitions and other enduring forms of distress, 
though in fact there is no identifiable psychiatric 
consequence. Such a victim should be able to bring an 
action for intentional infliction of mental distress 
against the perpetrator, as the intention can be readily 
imputed. Another potential situation for such an action 
is where the employer dismisses the employee who refuses a 
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sexual relationship. In some such circumstances the 
intention to cause emotional distress, and the suffering 
of that, can be readily imagined. 
F. Exemplary Damages 
While the fact that an assault or battery resulted in 
the injury to the victim is generally irrelevant for 
compensation purposes, the Court of Appeal in Donselaar v 
Donselaarl61 considered that a possible exception to the 
general rule may be if the injury is inflicted in the 
nature of a "high handed trespass to person••.162 The 
court said a right to exemplary damages as compared with 
compensatory damages may arise when a defendant has acted 
in contempt of the rights of another person and when it 
can be found that an award of compensatory damages is 
insufficient.163 "[In] determining liability for 
exemplary damages it is the quality of the defendant's 
conduct which is in question, not whether the plaintiff 
has suffered a particular type of harm".164 
However, it would be the unusual sexual harassment 
case indeed, before it could be said that the trespass to 
the person was so high handed that the court would give 
exemplary damages. 
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G. Accident Compensation 
Where the victim of sexual harassment has suffered a
 
personal injury by accident, although he or she may 
be 
precluded from bringing an action in tort against th
e 
perpetrator, compensation may be recoverable under t
he 
Accident Compensation Act 1982. 
XVI AREAS OTHER THAN EMPLOYMENT 
Whilst a tort action is not restricted to any 
particular area, the Human Rights Commission Act als
o 
deals with discrimination in areas other than employ
ment. 
The Human Rights Commission policy statement recogn
ised 
that the legislation also makes illegal sexual haras
sment 
occurring in the areas of education, provision of go
ods 
and services, access to public places and 
accommodation.165 
Although these areas are outside the scope of this 
paper, a few points may be noted. Section 22 of the
 Act 
provides that it is unlawful for a vocational traini
ng 
body to provide training on less favourable terms an
d 
conditions than would otherwise be made available by
 
reason of sex. Applying the approach of the sexual 
harassment in employment cases the section has scope
 for 
covering both the quid pro quo and hostile environm
ent 
situations. Where a teacher requires a student to c
omply 
with a sexual request before the student will be all
owed 
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to pass the course, it may be said that the training body 
has provided the training on less favourable terms to that 
student by reason of the student's sex. The act of the 
individual teacher may be attributed to the training 
body. It can be said that the terms were less favourable 
because a student, of that teacher, of the opposite sex 
would not have been required to comply with a sexual 
request before passing the course. This is assuming the 
teacher is not an equally treating bi-sexual teacher. 
Less favourable conditions may occur without the 
teacher making it a term of passing, or the like, that the 
student complies with a sexual request. If a teacher 
subjects a student to sexual harassment which is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to be able to say that 
that student's facilities for training are less favourable 
than a fellow student's of the opposite sex then, I 
submit, a breach of section 22 would have occurred. 
Sections 23-25 of the Act which deal with access by 
the public to places, vehicles and facilities; the 
provision of goods and services; and the provision of 
accommodation are concerned with the quid pro quo 
situations. Thus under section 24 it is unlawful for any 
person who supplies goods, facilities, or services to the 
public or any section of the public to refuse to provide 
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them by reason of sex. The shop owner who refused a 
credit facility unless the purchaser complies with a 
sexual demand may be said, assuming no bi-sexuality, to be 
discriminating by reason of sex if the gender-plus 
criteria is applied. Similar arguments apply to the other 
areas provided for in the sections. 
XVII REFORM 
The emphasis of the paper has been on the statutory 
law as it now stands, and the developments case law may 
take in the future based on the direction of overseas 
authorities. However, a matter which in the future may be 
given consideration is the enactment of legislation 
dealing specifically with sexual harassment and 
identifying it as a statutory legal concept. 
In some overseas jurisdictions the law has been 
reformed and legislation dealing with sexual harassment 
has been passed,166 rather than leaving the matter to be 
dealt with under the general anti-discrimination laws. 
A move such as this in New Zealand would recognize 
that, whilst present anti-discrimination laws under the 
Human Rights Commission Act do provide scope for dealing 
with sexual harassment, there are benefits in having 
legislation which enacts it as a specific legal concept. 
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In New Zealand, as we have seen, the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal in H v ~167 used the general provisions for 
giving some redress to a victim of sexual harassment, and 
by following overseas precedents the law can be extended 
further. However, sexual harassment does not fit as 
neatly into the present anti-discrimination laws as it 
might do. 
Where the illegality of sexual harassment is 
dependent on the behaviour being by reason of sex, then 
the behaviour of an equally treating bi-sexual employer 
who sexually harasses staff of both sexes is not illegal. 
Although an unlikely situation it does display an anomaly 
in using the present legislation for dealing with sexual 
harassment. Furthermore the illegality of sexual 
harassment should not depend on a comparison of the 
treatment which is accorded a staff member of one sex as 
compared with that which is or would be accorded a staff 
member of the opposite sex.168 The behaviour is 
reprehensible because of its nature, and not just because 
it was accorded to one person of one sex, yet not to a 
person of the opposite sex. This is in comparison with 
the situation where an employer disadvantages some 
employees by reason of their sex, and the act of creating 
a disadvantage to those employees is only wrongful because 
it is by reason of their sex. One example of this is an 
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employer refusing to give a staff discount to his female 
employees but giving one to his male employees because 
they are male. The act of refusing a staff discount is 
the employer's right, but when it is done by reason of sex 
it becomes reprehensible. Although sexual harassment can 
invariably be said to be substantially by reason of sex 
and therefore a sex discrimination problem, the behaviour 
does not require this element to make it reprehensible. 
Thus section 24(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(Western Australia) makes it "unlawful for a person to 
harass sexually" an employee. 
In any attempt to reform the law it would not be 
desirable to narrowly define the type of behaviour which 
can amount to sexual harassment. Thus in Loder the 
tribunal said: 
It would be wrong. . to attempt an exhaustive list 
as human inventiveness would almost certainly find 
other activities or approaches equally unwelcome and 
unpleasant which might then be denied the label of 
harassment.169 
Any legislative reform could encapsulate the ideas 
brought out by the cases, without having to list the type 
of behaviour which would be caught. One criteria would be 
that the conduct is unwelcome, as it is only then that it 
can in -any sense be considered harassment. Secondly the 
quid pro quo situation would be provided for. Where it 
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can be said that the employee has reasonable grounds for 
believing that rejection of the employer's sexual advance, 
or a refusal of the employer's request for sexual favours, 
or the taking of objection to the employer's sexual 
conduct would disadvantage the employee in any way in 
connection with the employment then the employer would 
have committed an unlawful act.170 Similarly where the 
employee has taken such action and suffered some 
disadvantage in any way in connection with the employment, 
then the employer would have committed an unlawful 
act.171 The section would have to be worded so as to deal 
with the situation where a person's possible employment is 
made conditional on complying with sexual requests.
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Finally, any legislation should be worded so that, if it 
can be said that the sexual harassment is so serious or 
pervasive that it results in the employee suffering the 
intangible disadvantage of a hostile work environment 
then, a breach has occurred. Recognition should be given 
to the fact that such conduct can include statements, both 
written and oral, of a sexual nature.173 
Any reform would of course have to go beyond the 
employment context and deal with the other areas presently 
dealt with by the Human Rights Commission Act. The 
provision of goods and services, access to public places 
and accommodation are all areas in which a power 
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relationship can develop so as to make them susceptible to 
a prevalence of sexual harassment. In education the 
problem can be even more acute. The position of power 
accorded to the "lecherous professor",174 or lecturer, or 
tutor allows that person to suggest that a lower grade or 
a fail might be forthcoming unless the student consents to 
a sexual relationship. The problem is often exacerbated 
in educational institutes because of the age differential 
between the harasser and the harassed. Although some 
institutions have their own internal regulations175 which 
provide a complaints procedure, legislation dealing with 
the matter is still desirable to cater for cases where 
there is no interal procedure, or where it fails. 
Legislation would primarily be concerned with dealing with 
the person who is in the position of power and sexually 
harasses the student, as compared with the student who 
harasses another student. Student harassment of each 
other is ideally left to be dealt with by internal 
procedures as the harasser has no institutional position 
of power. However, legislation could require educational 
institutes to take reasonable steps so as to provide a 
sexual harassment free environment. Such a requirement 
could be met by setting up a suitable complaints 
procedure. 
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One benefit of a statutory reform is the educative 
effect and raised awareness created by the legislation 
passing through the law making process. Furthermore once 
specifically identified in the statute books as unlawful, 
sexual harassment becomes more than just one of the many 
illegal discriminatory practices covered by the general 
anti-discrimination regime. 
As has been the approach overseas,176 any reform 
should not enact sexual harassment as a statutory wrong 
which is actionable in the ordinary courts. Instead, the 
Human Rights Commission mediation procedure is 
particularly suitable for dealing with the problem. Civil 
actions in the ordinary courts are lengthy, costly and 
lack the flexibility available under the Human Rights 
Commission process. The costs to the victim are less, and 
the procedure is more easily accessible to the victim than 
the ordinary court system. 
As a discrimination problem it is one for which the 
community should continue to take some responsibility 
rather than leaving the individual to bring an action 
against the perpetrator. 
The Commission provides an easily accessible and 
approachable structure with sympathetic people used to 
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dealing with such problems. They are in a position 
to 
sift out trivial complaints, hopefully reach a settlement 
by mediation, and if necessary bring an action before the 
Equal Opportunities Tribunal against the perpetrator, or 
assist the victim in so doing. A case before the tribunal
 
has a better chance of success than one before the 
ordinary courts as the tribunal is not bound by the 
ordinary rules as to the admissibility of evidence.
177 
This can be especially crucial in cases involving sexual 
harassment, where the unlawful acts will often have no 
witnesses, and proof will largely consist of hearsay 
evidence. 
The opportunity to sue in the ordinary courts in tort 
or contract, where appropriate, would still be available, 
though the practicalities of this will often limit its 
usefulness. 
One matter in urgent need of reform, I submit, is the 
maximum amount recoverable by the victim by way of 
damages. As has been seen, the emotional effects to the 
victim of being sexually harassed can be quite severe, and
 
for which $2,000 would have great difficulty in 
compensating. Where there are no such effects suffered, 
nominal damages, a declaration and/or an injunction will 
continue to be available.178 
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A further practical approach to the sexual harassment 
problem could be an amendment to the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973 so as to imply into every award an anti-sexual 
harassment clause. Although some awards already included 
such clausesl79 a standard implied clause can only be 
beneficial. 
XVIII THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Some consideration must be given to the criminal law 
because of the fact that in some more serious cases sexual 
harassment will involve a criminal act. This, though, 
will not always be the case. For example, in the poisoned 
environment case, where the employer has directed a 
barrage of lewd comments and suggestive remarks, as well 
as perhaps subtle and insidious acts, against an employee 
over a prolonged period. Although the behaviour has been 
such that it has made the employment environment 
unbearable and offensive for the employee, the chances are 
that there has been no breach of the criminal law. 
The situation will be different where the harasser 
has physically forced him or herself on the victim. Where 
there nas been no consent to sexual intercourse or some 
other sexual contact, and the perpetrator carries on 
regardless, then the victim will clearly have recourse to 
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the criminal law. "No" is clearly no. The offences of 
indecent assault and sexual violation will be the most 
likely canditates. 
A. Indecent Assault 
Indecent assault will not necessarily involve a 
battery, so it may be no more than an attempt to apply 
force or a threat by an act or gesture to do so. 
Similarly gentle, unwanted, touching may be enough. All 
that is required is an assault accompanied with the 
circumstances of indecency. Thus in Leeson18 0 acts of 
kissing and other familiarties were enough because they 
were accompanied by suggestions of sexual intercourse or 
sexual acts. Therefore an employer who threatens to 
fondle an employee, or actually does so, will commit an 
indecent assault. The employer who threatens to fire the 
employee, unless the employee consents to such activity 
will not commit on indecent assault, as there is no threat 
to apply force. In practical terms there is little 
distinction between the situations, because if the 
employee consents it is only under the threat of losing a 
job benefit. However, notwithstanding that threat, there 
will still have been consent and therefore no assault. 
If there is no indecent or sexual element, but there 
is force, or a threat to apply such force, then an offence 
of common assault may have been committed. 
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B. Sexual Violation 
Some sexual harassment cases may involve forced 
sexual intercourse or some other act of penetration for 
which there is no consent, in which case the harasser will
 
be criminally liable. 
Section 2 of the Crimes Amendment Act (No. 3) 1985 
repeals the old rape provisionl81 and creates a broader 
offence called ''sexual violation". Section 128B of the 
Crimes Act provides that it is an offence to commit sexual
 
violation. Sexual violation occurs when a male rapes a 
female or when a person has unlawful sexual connection 
with another person. 
The effect of section 128(2) is that a male rapes a 
female if he has sexual connection with that female 
occasioned by the penetration of her vagina by his penis 
without her consent.182 
Unlawful sexual connection, the second way sexual 
violation can occur, is so defined that it covers all rape
 
cases as well as other acts.183 Sexual connection occurs 
when the vagina or the anus of any person is penetrated by
 
any part of the body of any other person or any object 
held or manipulated by any other person,184 or when the 
mouth or tongue of any person connects with any part of 
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the genitalia of any other person, or when such sexual 
connection is continued.185 The sexual connection is 
unlawful if a person has sexual connection with another 
without their consent.186 As the definition is sexless 
either a male or a female may be the principal offender, 
and either a male or a female may be the victim. 
The important in deciding whether sexual connection 
was unlawful so as to consistute sexual violation is 
whether or not there was consent. There is no consent if 
a person submits to or acquiesces in sexual connection by 
reason of: the actual or threatened application of force 
to that person or some other person; the fear of such 
force; a mistake as to the identity of the offender; a 
mistake as to the nature and quality of the act.187 
In what other circumstances will there be a lack of 
consent? If after an employment related threat made by 
the employer, an employee passively allows sexual 
connection to take place, can it be said there is no 
consent? Section 128A provides that "the fact that a 
person does not protest or offer physical resistance to 
sexual connection does not by itself constitute consent 
.", without giving any hint as to what might be 
required for consent in such circumstances. Orchard says 
that "[a]t present the law is excessively uncertain.188 
In Holmanl89 where the legislation provided that the 
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offence occurred in the absence of consent, or where in 
some cases acquiescence was obtained by force, threats, 
fear or fraud, Jackson C.J. said the trial judge was in 
error in directing that an absence of "completely willing 
consent" would result in liability. He said: 
A woman's consent to intercourse may be hesitant, 
reluctant, grudging or tearful, but if she 
consciously permits it (providing her permission is 
not obtained by force, threats, fear or fraud) it is 
not rape. 190 
Orchard concludes that in practice it seems probable that 
a similar principle will apply in New Zealand, and that 
conscious submission by a sane adult will be equated with 
consent unless force, fear or mistake within the terms of 
section 128A(2) applies. From this it follows that where 
consent to sexual connection has been obtained by the use 
of employment related threats, and sexual connection has 
followed there will have been no breach of section 128. 
This approach is necessarily correct when one 
considers the terms of section 129A of the Crimes Act. 1 91 
Section 129A provides that it is an offence to have 
sexual connection with another person knowing that 
the other person has been induced to consent to 
sexual connection by -
(a) An express or implied threat that the person 
having sexual connection or some other person will 
commit an offence which is punishable by imprisonment 
but which does not involve the actual or threatened 
application of force to any person; or 
(b) An express or implied threat that the person 
having sexual connection or some other person will 
make an accusation (whether true or false) about 
misconduct by any person (whether living or dead) 
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that is likely to damage seriously the reputation of 
the person against or about whom the accusation or 
disclosure is made. 
(c) An express or implied threat by the person 
having sexual connection to make improper use, to the 
detriment of the other person, of any power of 
authority arising out of any occupational or 
vocational position held by the person having sexual 
connection or any commercial relationship existing 
between that person and the other person. 
It follows from this section that agreement to sexual 
connection obtained by threats of the kind described in 
section 129A must amount to "consent'' for the purposes of 
section 128. Furthermore, unlike section 128A (which 
provides that certain matters will not constitute 
consent), there is nothing in section 129A which provides 
that the terms of this section do not limit the 
circumstances in which there is no consent for the 
purposes of section 128. 
that, 
Orchard suggests because of 
There seems to be a strong argument that, given that 
section 129A threats do not exclude consent, there 
will be consent if a sane adult acquiesces as a 
result of threats or pressures which do not involve 
force to a person and which are not within section 
129A.192 
Thus although sexual harassment may often involve the 
obtaining of agreement to sexual connection by the making 
of threats, unless those threats fall within section 
128A(2), that agreement will amount to "consent''. 
c. Inducing Sexual Connection by Coercion 
Following the enactment of section 129A, there are 
some circumstances in which a person who has consensual 
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sexual connection will have committed a crime because the 
consent was induced by reason of certain threats. If the 
person knows that the person with whom they have sexual 
connection was induced to consent by an express or implied
 
threat which falls within paragraphs (a)-(c), then an 
offence will have been committed. Thus there would be no 
offence committed by A under section 129A if A has sexual 
connection with B who has been induced to consent by a 
threat made by c,193 and A is unaware of the inducement. 
There may also be circumstances where although a person 
made the threat they were unaware it induced consent. 
Orchard says "[p]resumably a person will have the 
requisite knowledge only if he or she is virtually certain
 
of the reason for consent, or "knew what the answer was 
going to be 'if inquiry was made
11 .19 4 
Sexual harassment in employment and elsewhere, may 
often involve the harasser having sexual connection 
knowing that consent to that act was induced by a threat 
of some description. What sort of threats will make that 
sexual connection criminal? 
1. Sections 129A(l)(a) and (b) 
Paragraph (a) is straightforward. The reason cases 
involving the actual or threatened application of force 
are excepted is because they are caught by section 128. 
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Likewise paragraph (b) presents little difficulty e
xcept 
perhaps for the question of what sort of accusation
 or 
disclosure is likely to seriously damage a person's
 
reputation. 
In some cases an offence against these two paragrap
hs 
will also be an offence against the extortion prov
isions 
of the Crimes Act, or what is in common parlance kn
own as 
blackmail. Section 238(1) makes it an offence to, 
with 
intent to extort or gain anything from any person, 
make 
certain threats relating to accusations or disclosu
res of 
any offence, or of sexual misconduct, or publishing
 
criminal libel or slander. Section 238(3)(a) furth
er 
provides that it is an offence to make any such thr
eat 
with intent to induce any person to do any act aga
inst 
their will. 
In Police v Johnstonl95 Beattie J. held that 
"anything" is generally limited to things capable ~
f being 
stolen and other forms of property. In that case t
he 
appellant had induced consent to sexual intercourse
 by 
threatening to make disclosures as to sexual miscon
duct by 
the complainant. Beattie J. held that it was not t
he 
intent of the legislation to include intercourse as
 
"anything'', therefore the prosecution was wrong in 
suggesting that having sexual intercourse would be 
a gain 
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to the appellant.196 However, he held that the wording of 
section 238(3) was apposite to the facts of the case as 
the appellant made the threat with the intent that the 
woman do an act against her will.197 There is authority 
for the view that the threat for the purposes of section 
238 must be such as would deprive a reasonable person of 
their free volition and put a compulsion on them, though 
this should be liberally construed, since victims of such 
offences are not as a rule of average firmness. 1
98 The 
offence is complete on the threat being made, so the act 
does not have to occur. 
Where a person makes a threat within the limited 
terms of section 238(1) intending to induce consent to a 
sexual act then an offence will have been committed under 
that section. Where a person has then had sexual 
connection with the person threatened, knowing that their 
consent was induced by the threat an offence is also 
likely to have been committed under section 129A(a~ or 
( b) • If the threat was a threat to publish criminal libel 
then it would be a threat for the purposes of section 
129A(a) and probably (b). If as on the facts of 
Johnstonl99 it was a threat to disclose sexual misconduct, 
or the commission of an offence, it would fall within 
section 129A(b). 
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The person who makes a threat which leads to an 
offence under section 129A will not necessarily have 
committed an offence under section 238, even though the 
threat was one of the sort described in that section, 
because under section 129A it is not necessary that the 
threat was made with sexual connection in mind. 
2. Section 129~ (c) 
Paragraph (c) presents somewhat more difficlty. It 
has been described as effectively elevating "sexual 
harassment leading to sexual connection to the status of a 
major crime 112 00 and thus one might expect it to cover many 
of the successful, from the perpetrator's point of view, 
quid pro quo cases of sexual harassment. However, a 
closer examination reveals that this is not always so and 
that there are many situations where what might be called 
"sexual harassment leading to sexual connection'' is not 
caught. The wording of the provision limits the cases 
which will be caught; the problem is defining what those 
limits are. 
An aid in establishing this is to ask, what is the 
offence aimed at? Is it the threatened abuse of power or 
the act of having sexual connection with a person who has 
consented only by reason of being threatened with some 
detriment? The incorporation of the provision into the 
117. 
Act followed many submissions condemning the obtaining of 
sexual relations by coercion; that is by threats of abuse 
of position of authority.201 One speaker saw the 
importance of the provision as being that "the use of 
authority relationships, which lies at the very heart of 
the meaning of power, should not be misused to gain sexual 
favours or sexual satisfaction
11 .202 The offence may 
therefore be better viewed as an abuse of authority 
offence rather than a sexual offence. The wrong lies in 
the first instance with the threatened abuse of power, 
though it is the connection which is illegal. 
The fact that it is an abuse of authority offence, 
rather than a sexual offence, explains why 129A(c) is only 
concerned with threats made by, and to be carried out by, 
the offender, while under 129A(a) and (b) the threat may 
be made by another person and the threat can be that 
someone other than the offender will take action. 
One further requirement is that the threatened action 
must be one which would be to the "detriment" of the 
victim. A fine line may be drawn between the case where a 
person is receiving a benefit in return for their consent 
to sexual connection and the case where the person is not 
suffering any detriment, by receiving the promotion which 
was due to the victim anyway. If it is clear that the 
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victim would have been entitled to the "benefit" anyway, 
it must be a case where the person has been induced to 
consent by the threat of otherwise suffering some 
detriment. However, is there an element of detriment 
where there is a promise of a benefit, which is not 
otherwise merited, in return for consent to sexual 
connection? 
The Minister of Justice in a speech to Parliament 
said paragraph (c) is 
directed against coercive behaviour. It does not 
apply to the circumstances when a person in a 
position of authority offers a reward in exchange for 
sexual favours . . An employer who threatens 
dismissal without cause, for example will clearly be 
caught. On the other hand an employer who offers an 
inducement for example a promotion that is not 
merited and would not otherwise be granted - is not 
caught. In that position the employee does not stand 
to suffer detriment through the improper exercise of 
a power. That is not to say that such behaviour is 
commendable but it is not in the nature of the type 
of coercive threat with which this offence is 
concerned. 203 
The Minister has intended a narrow approach to be taken 
when interpreting the section and assumed that ''detriment" 
is restricted to a threat to take away something the 
victim has or is entitled to, or at least might become 
entitled to, and will therefore not cover a threat not to 
confer a benefit to which the victim has no automatic 
entitlement. 
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However, is it necessarily so that an employer who 
offers a promotion on condition that consent to sexual 
connection is forthcoming, or says to a prospective 
employee that he or she will only get the job in return 
for such consent, is not making a threat involving a 
''detriment". Whether it is framed as a promise to perform
 
the action only if . ., or a threat not to do it unless
 
., seems to be of no consequence. From the victim's 
point of view he or she will suffer a detriment unless 
consent is forthcoming. The employer can be said to be 
making a threat to use the power not to employ, or not to
 
grant a promotion, which will be to the detriment of the 
victim. 
The approach the courts take remains to be seen. 
They may follow the intended meaning and draw a line 
between what the victim had or was entitled to anyway, an
d 
something that is a discretionary benefit, and say only i
n 
the first case is there any detriment. Alternatively the
y 
may take a wider view of detriment, which is open on the 
wording of the provision. In any case both situations 
involve the use of power to coerce consent, the evil the 
section is aimed at. 
A further requirement of the provision is that the 
threat be one to make "improper'' use of a power. The 
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Minister of Justice indicated that this means the use of a 
power without cause.204 Therefore section 129A(c) appears 
to be excluded if there was a legitimate ground for the 
threatened action, even though the threat was intended to 
and did induce consent to sexual connection. Thus an 
employee who is caught stealing at work may be induced to 
consent to sexual connection by a threat of dismissal, and 
there will be no breach of section 129A(c) as the use of 
power threatened was proper give that the dismissal would 
have been justified. Although the employer is abusing her 
or his power in an attempt to induce consent, the 
behaviour is not caught. Arguably this puts serious and 
unnecessary limits on the whole provision. Nevertheless 
as improper is defined in terms of us, if the use 
threatened is not improper it falls outside the 
provision. This is unfortunate as the power 1s abused 
just as much whether the use threatened is a proper one or 
an improper one. 
One situation which would not fall within the 
provision is a supervisor purporting to have the authority 
to fire their charge unless that person has sexual 
connection with the supervisor, and that worker in the 
belief that the supervisor does have the power, being 
induced to consent by the threat. As an abuse of 
authority offence the terms of the section require that 
the power or authority must actually arise; it must 
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actually exist. It is unfortunate that such a si
tuation 
is not caught, as it can be seen as being analagous
 to "a 
mistake as to the identity of the other person", a 
fact 
which prevents there being any consent for the purp
oses of 
section 128. 
The threat made must be one to improperly use any 
power or authority. However, that power or authority
 must 
arise out of an occupational or vocational position
, or a 
commercial relationship between the offender and th
e 
victim. If it is something that could be done apar
t from 
that position or relationship, then it has not aris
en out 
of it. 
An occupational or vocational position is clearly a
 
position pertaining to any employment, trade or 
profession. Thus it will not only cover actions re
lating 
to employees, or their charges in the capacity of 
supervisor, but also the use of powers in relation 
to the 
general public. For example, an employee of a quan
go 
threatening to use their discretionary power, which
 arises 
out of their employment, to revoke a licence unless
 the 
victim has sexual connection. If, though, there we
re 
justifiable grounds on which to revoke the licence, 
then 
it would not be caught as the use threatened would 
not be 
improper. 
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One question which may fall to be decided on the 
facts of particular cases is how broadly "occupational or 
vocational position" will be defined. Whilst it clearly 
covers paid employment, it does not seem apt to cover 
positions arising out of leisure time voluntary pursuits 
such as in clubs and societies. This, though, may depend 
on the extent of a person's involvement. However, it is 
unlikely, for example, that a person who is the president 
of a stamp club, for which members attend monthly meetings 
can be said to have power arising out of an occupational 
or vocational position. Whilst a priest's position in the 
Catholic church is clearly occupational and vocational, 
the position would become less clear with the leader of 
small religious sect. 
One major area of the sexual harassment problem is 
educational institutes. Lecturers and teachers clearly 
have power arising out of occupational or vocational 
positions, and one who suggests to a passing student that 
a fail will be forthcoming unless there is consent to 
sexual connection will have made a threat for the purposes 
of the section. 
Finally the power may arise out of an existing 
commercial relationship with the victim. A threat to 
breach a contract for the delivery of goods by not 
delivering them will be caught, but many threats will not 
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involve improper uses. For example a creditor who 
threatens to repossGss goods, or take bankruptcy 
proceedings, or enforce their right of sale as a mortgagee 
unless the debtor consents to sexual connection, may be 
threatening something they are entitled to do and 
therefore it would not be an improper use. 
D. Is the Criminal Law an Answer? 
The criminal law as an answer to the sexual 
harassment problem has its limitations. From the victim's 
point of view reliving the experience of having been 
sexually violated, throughout a long enquiry, and during 
the criminal trial, especially where giving evidence in 
chief and being cross-examined, can present great 
difficulties. 
Sexual harassment occurs because the offender thinks 
the situation can be safely exploited. Often the crime is 
thought of as just a misplacement by the offender of 
otherwise natural feelings of attraction, when in fact it 
is a crime of abuse of power. Nevertheless, an inquiry in 
to whether or not the victim consented or was wrongfully 
coerced into consenting, extends into what the victim did 
to arouse this desire, and whether the victim found the 
sexual attack gratifying. Thus it may be the victim not 
the offender who is made to stand trial. 
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Some new amendments to the law, do however provide 
increased protection for the victim.205 For instance 
there is some restriction on the evidence which may be 
adduced in relation to the complainants past sexual 
experiences with people other than the accused.205 The 
Summary Proceedings Amendment Act (No. 4) 1985 reflects to
 
some extent the difficulties from a complainant's point o
f 
view of pursuing a prosecution for sexual violation. It 
provides that at any preliminary hearing of sexual 
violation or section 129A offences a complainants evidenc
e 
will be given by written statement and the complainant 
will not be subject to examination or cross-examination, 
except by their own election to give oral evidence, or if
 
it is ordered by the judge in the interests of justice. 
This section gives some protection against a prosecution 
being thwarted at the outset by a victim's inability to 
give oral evidence becuase of the emotional trauma, and 
prevents the victim from having to go through it twice in
 
court. However, the real "trial'' for the victim will 
still be giving oral evidence at the main hearing, 
especially during cross-examination. Section 375A(2), 
a 
new provision of the Crimes Act, reflects this by limiting
 
the people who may be present in the court room whilst th
e 
complainant in a case involving sexual violation gives 
oral evidence. As well, where the interests of the victim 
require it, the court may make an order forbidding 
publication of the details of the alleged sexual acts. 
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The reality is that prosecution of sexual harassment 
cases under the Crimes Act provisions will be very 
difficult, especially under the new section 129A 
provision. The very intimacy of such sexual crimes means 
that there will rarely be witnesses, and evidence will 
largely consist of the complainant's and accused's 
testimonies, and any inferences which can be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence. A new section of the Evidence 
Act 1908, section 23A, inserted by the 1985 amendment (No. 
2), provides that no corroboration of a complainant's 
evidence is necessary in sexual cases. This does not 
bring about a change in the law. However the section also 
provides that 1n such a case the judge is no longer 
required to give a warning to the jury as to the dangers 
of relying on such uncorroborated evidence, though this 
may be done at the judge's discretion. Even without a 
warning a jury may still tend to treat such uncorroborated 
evidence with suspicion and accord it less weight. This 
may be especially so where the accused is a ''respectable" 
member of the community and the complainant a mere 
secretary of some powerful corporate manager. 
• 
"Privacy sanctifies the sphere of the sexual, with 
the crimes being committed in the absence of 
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non-participant witnesses. Thus proof in these sex
ual 
harassment cases will be extremely difficult. The 
effectiveness of a criminal action as an avenue fo
r 
dealing with the attacks, as compared with a civil 
action, 
is reduced by the fact that a higher standard of pr
oof is 
required to convict a person of a criminal offence.
 In a 
civil action the case must be proved to the standar
d of 
the balance of probabilities, though in many sexua
l 
harassment cases the gravity of the allegations wi
ll 
dictate that the balance be satisfied to a high de
gree, 2 07 
however it would never reach the very high standard
 
required by the criminal law of beyond reasonable d
oubt. 
To prove there is no doubt that the threat was made
 with 
the necessary intention and that the sexual act occ
urred 
with knowledge that the consent was induced by the 
threat 
will in many cases be impossible, or from the victi
m's 
point of view not be worth the torment. 
Another factor is that prosecution will largely be 
at 
t 
the discretion of the police. The extent to which 
police 
will take seriously an offence under section 129A(
c), 
where the victim has "consented'' to the connection
, must 
be iD some doubt when at the same time resources ar
e 
stretched in an attempt to catch 'real' violent 
offenders. This is especially so considering the 
difficulties which a prosecution under that section
 will 
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present. Evidential problems may be compounded by the 
fact that the "offender" may be a company director or some 
other "respectable" member of the community and the victim 
a "mere" employee, with much less status in the community. 
Although a private prosectuion is possible, the 
financial cost to the victim does not really make this a 
viable alternative. 
Finally, the sanctions on the perpetrator will more 
than likely be imprisonment or in a more minor case, of 
say assault, a fine. Thus although a successful 
conviction will serve the purpose from the victim's point 
of view of removing the problem, and possibly having some 
retributive effect, it will not provide any compensation 
for the emotional and psychological damage done, nor for 
any tangible losses suffered because of any detriment 
caused by the offender's power over the victim. There 
will be no reinstatement for any employment lost, nor will 
any merited promotion be granted. 
Whilst the criminal law as a response to sexual 
harassment has many practical limitations, after the 
offensive behaviour has occurred, it hopefully in some 
cases prevents that stage from being reached. Section 
129A itself was passed in light of an increasing awareness 
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of the use of power to obtain sexual favours. By 
legislating against such behaviour in certain 
circumstances the necessary educative process required to 
tackle the problem of sexual harassment is continued. An 
awareness that there is now a criminal sanction available, 
which makes inducing consent by threats of harm in some 
circumstances culpable behaviour, may deter people from 
behaviour in which some previously saw no wrong. 
MacKinnon says "men who sexually harass women are commonly 
dumbfounded that the women resent it, even when the women 
have declined flatly from the beginning and resisted 
explicitly throughout".208 The legislation has stamped 
society's disapproval on sexual harassment, in its more 
serious forms, involving actual bodily harm, or the 
application or threat of application of force, and abuses 
of power. 
E. Section 21 Summary Offences Act 1981 
Section 21 of the Summary Offences Act potentially 
covers some sexual harassment cases which do not involve 
any physical contact, or a threat or application of force. 
Section 21 provides: 
(1) Every person is liable . . who, with intent to 
frighten or intimidate any other person - . 
(b) Follows that other person about from place to 
place, or. 
(d) Watches or besets the house or other place where 
that person resides, or works, or carries on 
business, or happens to be . 
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In Police v Brown & Ors,209 the judge was critical of 
the fact that the section was couched in terms which would 
not normally be in common usage in New Zealand today. He 
therefore adhered to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
Definition of besetting as being to hem in; occupy and 
make impassable". An employer, or anyone who is insistent 
on sexually harassing a person, and who follows that 
person around, or perhaps hems them in at work, may be 
caught by the section. However, the difficulty is going 
to be proving an intention to fringten or intimidate. It 
will be difficult to show such an intention where the 
accused followed the person only because he or she was 
attracted to that person. Hemming a person in, in an 
attempt to convince the person to agree to a sexual 
relationship does not reflect an intention to frighten or 
intimidate, though it may be harassment. 
F. Harassment as a Criminal Offence 
Is there any potential for further criminal 
legislation which is aimed not at cases where a sexual act 
occurs, or at the making of threats in an attempt to 
obtain sexual favours, rather at the act of persistently 
harassing another person? Such a section might provide 
that it is an offence to harass another person by making 
demands, or requests, or comments, or by performing acts, 
which by reason of their nature, or frequency, or manne~ 
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of making are calculated to subject that person to alarm, 
distress or humiliation.210 
Whilst an offence of unlawful harassment would catch 
many of the more serious hostile environment sexual 
harassment cases, such behaviour is better left to be 
dealt with by the civil law. First, it is debatable 
whether such behaviour which does not actually involve a 
physical violation, or a threat of such violation should 
carry the stigma of being a criminal offence. Whilst it 
may be anti-social, civil remedies should suffice. In any 
case for reasons mentioned earlier in relation to section 
129A(c) of the Crimes Act, it is unlikely that such an 
offence would be taken seriously by the authorities. 
Furthermore the difficulties of proving an offence, 
especially the intention, to the criminal standard creates 
doubts as to the workability of such an offence. 
XIX CONCLUSION 
MacKinnon said that, 
Working women are defined and survive by defining 
themselves assexually accessible and economically 
exploitable. Because they are economically 
vulnerable, they are sexually exposed; because they 
must be sexually accessible, they are always 
economically at risk.211 
Although sexual harassment is not only a problem for 
women, structural inequalities and sterotyping will ensure 
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that in most cases a woman is the victim. In employment 
the causes may be economic, in that economics provides the 
power, but the effects are much more. A tangible loss may 
or may not be suffered, but it is the intangible effects 
which cause the pain. 
Furthermore, leaving aside the pain suffered by the 
victim, the discriminatory environment also introduces an 
impurity into society that needs to be eradicated. 
Discrimination and inequality should be met by the legal 
system with an attempt to break them down. No one should 
have to survive by defining themselves as sexually 
accessible. Society should not have to suffer unwarranted 
discrimination. 
The Equal Opportunities Tribunal in~ v ~212 
developed the law in New Zealand so as to define sexual 
harassment as unlawful discrimination in certain cases. 
It is the responsibility of the law to ensure that it 
continues to develop to meet new situations. Although the 
law is only part of the solution, it is the starting 
point, and therefore a legal response to sexual harassment 
must be maintained. 
132. 
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